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The Several Futures of Property:

Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission
Trades and Ecosystems
Carol M. Roset
INTRODUCTION
Private property has long been associated with gloomy
images-the rapaciousness of various Robber Barons on the
one hand, the musty casuistry of future interests and the Rule
Against Perpetuities on the other. But in the late twentieth
century, property seems blessed with a bright, perhaps even
glamorous future. This article is an essay to predict that
future-that is, to predict at least some of the directions that
the institution of property is likely to take over the next
generation.
Property has always been one of the chief ways through
which human beings have avoided what is alleged to be the
"tragedy of the commons." That is the situation in which
unowned and unmanaged common resources are available to
all, with the consequence that entrants crowd onto these
resources, overusing them and underinvesting in their
maintenance and improvement. I One chief rival to property in
allaying the "tragedy" has been a system of directives from
above: command and control governmental regimes avoid the
t For helpful comments, I would like to thank especially Jamie Boyle,
Hanoch Dagan, Robert Ellickson, Daniel Esty, Daniel Farber, Katherine
Franke, Richard Lazarus, Alison Rieser, John Setear, Sylvia Tesh, Michael
Treanor, Laura Underkuffler-Freund, and the participants at the AALS
Washington workshop on property law (June 1997) and law faculty workshops
at Fordham, Georgetown, the University of Virginia, and Yale. For able
research assistance, I thank Shelley White. Special thanks to the University
of Minnesota Law School for inviting me to give the Lockhart Lecture on
which this article is based.
L See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243,
1244 (1968); see also H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a CommonProperty Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124, 134 (1954) (giving an
earlier version of the theory of the tragedy of the commons).
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tragedy through the application of central planning and
administration. But today, in the era following the general
disillusionment with Marxist economics, property and its close
companion, contract, at least in theory have all but swept away
command and control as a device for managing resources.
From the demise of the authoritarian socialist regimes, we
have taken the lesson that modern economies need not the
centralization of direct governmental control, but rather the
decentralization associated with property and contract. 2
As a part of a more general privatization of the world's
economies, property seems to be thriving on all kinds of fronts.
Newly invigorated market-oriented economies look to private
property solutions for a variety of social issues, from fishery
management to cyberspace, from air pollution to the
dismantling of once forcibly collectivized farms and factories.
Indeed, the current confidence about individual private
property brings to mind some of the early modern hopes for
property as an almost redemptive social institution. Carolyn
Merchant, a feminist environmental historian, has recently
revisited John Locke's famous disquisition on property, and
has concluded that in Locke's view, property would reintroduce
humankind to a new version of Eden.3
How could property reacquaint us with Eden? While
Merchant did not describe this process explicitly, the idea
seems to be that, in seventeenth century theological
terminology, property yokes the fallen and sinful nature of
human beings to the Biblical command to labor. We humans
are lazy, and disinclined to work. But property, by
concentrating resource control on individuals, takes advantage
of each individual's sinfulness-or as we now call it, selfinterest.4 With property, each individual harvests the rewards
of her care and effort in the management of her resources, just
as she suffers the losses from her sloth and poor management;

2. See Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law
Merchant: A Model of Decentralization, 4 INTL. REv. L. & EcoN. 215, 216
(1994).
3. See Carolyn Merchant, Paradise and Property: Locke's Narrative and
the Transformation of Nature (Mar. 7, 1997) (unpublished manuscript
presented to the Am. Socy For Envtl. Hist., Baltimore, MD, on file with
author).
4 See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASsIONS AND THE INTERESTS 31-42
(1977) (describing the early modem intellectual discussion of transforming
sinful "avarice" into benign "interest").
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those features of property make her vastly more likely to
exercise diligence and prudence about the things she owns.
And property does more: it identifies who has what. In
performing this basic function, property allows owners to trade
with one another,5 rather than getting into unproductive and
wasteful fights over resources. Trade in turn yields information
about who wants what and how much, permitting individuals
to specialize their labor on the things that others desire. As
Adam Smith so trenchantly pointed out, specialization makes
an individual's labor all the more valuable, thus further
enticing otherwise slothful humans to labor. 6 In all these
ways, property enhances peaceable, fruitful effortcompetitive, to be sure, but competitive within nondestructive
bounds. With the ensuing grand bustle of trade and labor, we
all grow richer. What's more, we do so in an environment of
peace rather than of conflict.
Hence we arrive at the new Eden, the new paradise, or as
Adam Smith called it, the Wealth of Nations. These benefits of
property-enhancing wealth, dispelling conflict-are wellknown, and they have been stressed anew in the modern law
and economics movement.7 If we take that perspective at face
value, it would seem that the more things that get turned into
property, the better. Is this, then, the future of property-the
universal application of "propertization," in the sense of
turning all resources into individual private property?
Probably not. While other authors-notably Margaret
Radin-have pointed out some normative problems in
"commodifying" some kinds of good things,8 the law and
economics perspective in itself yields some insights why, as a
matter simply of factual prediction, universal commodification
or propertization is unlikely. In the following pages I will first
5.

Cf. Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:Dividinga Legal

Entitlement to FacilitateCoasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1037-39 (1995)

(arguing that property interests may impede trade by creating opportunities
for strategic bargaining). But see Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The
Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2182-88 (1997) (criticizing this argument by
pointing out several ways that property reduces other bargaining costs).
6. See 1 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 7-8, 13-16 (Mod. Lib.
ed. 1937).
7. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 32 (4th ed.
1992).
8. See Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1849, 1870-74, 1877-87 (1987) (arguing that commodification of certain objects
might be antagonistic to the interests of personhood).
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describe some reasons why even an economic approach might
be skeptical of universal propertization. Then I will turn to
two of the most dynamic arenas for the development of
property concepts, namely cyberspace and environmental
management. 9 Resource management in these areas illustrates
some very rich modern possibilities for property, but it also
illustrates some well-grounded challenges to universal
propertization, even on purely economic grounds.
Interestingly enough, the objections to propertization-the
arguments of "too much property"-take quite different turns
in these two areas. In the cyberspace arena, critics of property
generally call for the removal of property altogether; that is, to
a kind of return to an unowned commons or unmanaged public
space with respect to cyberspace information and creative
effort. In the environmental arena, on the other hand, critics
of property tend to call for more hands-on public management
of environmental resources, even for the command and control
techniques supposedly now discredited.
A central argument of this article, however, is that we
need to consider and refine our thinking about still another
and rather different category of property. This category is
what I call the "limited common property" or LCP-property
held as a commons among the members of a group, but
exclusively vis-h-vis the outside world. I will argue that the
new developments in cyberspace and environmentalism
particularly demonstrate how much we need to develop our
concepts of the LCP, a property type that is neither entirely
individualistic nor entirely public. Our legal system has
hitherto been oddly oblivious to many forms of limited common
property-even though common property itself is actually
ubiquitous, if unremarked. 10 The reasons for that obliviousness
are in some measure economic, but they are also in part
cultural-a culture now quite dramatically challenged by the

9. Another author who has noted some relationships between cyberspace
and environmentalism is James Boyle, though his analysis takes a rather
different direction. See James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property:
Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87 (1997) (discussing a more
political approach to decisionmaking in both areas).
10.

See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., PERSPECTiVES ON PROPERTY LAW

xii (2d ed. 1995) (citing shared dormitory room as common property); Robert

C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1394-95 (1993) (observing

that the vast majority of the American population lives in multi-person
households, a form of limited-access "commons").
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questions of property in intellectual creativity and environmental protection.
I. LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACHES TO PREDICTING
PROPERTY
Why might economists bridle at the notion that everything
can be turned into property? The dominating reason is simple:
economists point out that, for all their benefits, property
regimes are not to be had for free. I1 It costs something to
define rights, to monitor trespasses, and to expel intruders.
Even with a relatively simple resource like land, it costs
something to build a fence, to keep an eye on interlopers, and
to maintain a police force to remove them. It costs vastly more
12
to establish, track, and enforce property rights in body parts,1 4
reproductive material, 3 or air pollution emission rights,
particularly when those rights are transferable. We do not
bother with the elaborate record keeping systems and enforcement devices for such rights unless the collective returns are
high enough to cover the costs-and even then we may not
bother, if too few people can be convinced that they personally
will improve their positions through a system of defined
property rights."5

11 See Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property
Rights, 7 J.L. & EcoN. 11, 14 (1964) (referring to the cost of systems that
control and exchange goods, regardless of whether the systems are based on
property or governmental alternatives).
12. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 488-97 (Cal.
1989), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991) (refusing to recognize a property right
in favor of donor of bodily materials from which cell line was developed).
13. See, e.g., Kerry Cork, Comment, Test Tube Parents: Collaborative
Reproduction in Minnesota, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1535, 1541-46 (1996)
(discussing inadequacies of record keeping for sperm donation and recent
changes regarding the demand of anonymity, and identifying similar problems
with record keeping for donated eggs).
14. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (1994) (establishing
program for tradable emission permits in acid rain precursors).
15. See Demsetz, supra note 11, at 16-20 (noting the ability of a property
regime to generate information, but arguing that it is only efficient to have
such a regime when the information is worth more than the costs); GARY D.
LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 19-26 (1989) (describing the
impediments to establishing property regimes even when aggregate benefits
outweigh costs); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics,
109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 651 (1996) (describing systems as "strong path
dependence" if information and political considerations prevent even efficient
changes in legal regimes).
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This approach means that if we are going to predict
changes in what counts as property, at a minimum we have to
take into account both the costs and the benefits of
establishing property regimes or modifying existing ones. This
accounting, of course, is only a minimum-a necessary but not
sufficient precondition for establishing or altering property
regimes, because many other impediments lie in the way even
of cost-effective changes in property. Property regimes involve
collective efforts, and they can fall victim to the usual
pathologies of collective action-shirking, uncorrected misinformation, rent-seeking and bickering, among others.' 6 But
if the minimal calculus of costs and benefits does not come out
right, we are unlikely even to get to those pathologies; we will
not even think about establishing or modifying property
regimes at all.

A. SCARCITY AND PROPERTY'S BENEFITS
Looking first to the benefit side of property rights, law and
economics scholars note that the payoffs from property are very
strongly associated with scarcity. Nobody bothers to create
property for some resource that lies around in abundance.
Even crows dispense with their normal territoriality when food
is plentiful; they allow other nesting crow families to join them,
and even occasionally feed the neighbors' kids.17 There are
good reasons for this relaxed attitude, for humans as well as
crows. A plentiful resource does not produce strife among rival
claimants. More important for humans, there is no particular
point in trying to encourage investment in order to produce
more of something that is already abundant. Hence on those
two very standard grounds why the institution of property can
16. See LIBECAP, supra note 15, at 24 (discussing the problem of
deception in collective action); Roe, supra note 15, at 651 (describing
information barriers that induce strong path dependence); see also James E.
Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, PartII, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 325,
334-39 (1992) (discussing human self-interest and collective action problems
in property regimes); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 51-52 (1990) (discussing how the
perceptions of actors in collective activities may lead to inefficient bargains);
CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 35-39 (1994) (explaining how
individuals in collective activities are motivated to cheat on any
arrangement); Carol M. Rose, Environmental Lessons, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1023, 1024-26 (1994) (attributing human inattention to common resource
problems to a lack of motivation and information).
17. See Jane E. Brody, The Too-Common Crow, Too Close for Comfort,
N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1997, at C1.
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be helpful in human affairs-allaying strife and encouraging
investment-there is no reason to go through the time and
effort it takes to establish a system of property rights for an
abundant resource.
But when a resource becomes scarce or pressured, there
are many more benefits associated with some form of resource
management, including property. Under conditions of scarcity,
it is much more likely that the resource will respond to what
the institution of property can do-that is,
encourage
investment and contain strife. This, of course, leads to the
next question: when do resources become scarce, so that it
might be worth the effort to establish some kind of property
rights regime for their management? There are various events
or developments that cause resources to become scarce (e.g.,
natural disasters), but one such development is simply an
increase in humans' interest in the resource. Native American
hunters created property rights in beaver habitat in response
to the European fad for furs.18 The oil industry created much
more sophisticated property regimes for crude oil and its
derivatives after automobiles were invented and created a
huge market for petroleum products.19 And, more generally, if
lots of people come to want some previously unowned resource,
it may be predicted that someone is going to try to claim it as
property. In fact, that is when we most need some kind of
system of property: when too many people want something,
property rights can mediate disputes by enabling the claimants
to negotiate and trade instead of fighting among themselves.
Thus, one place to look for changes in property regimesthat is, to discern the possible future of property-is to look for
resources that come under greater pressure. Scarcity or
pressure will not automatically produce property regimes, 20 but
18. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM.
ECON. REV. 347, 351-53 (Pap. and Proc. 1967) (citing the work of Eleanor
Leacock who demonstrated a close relationship between the development of
private rights in land and the development of the commercial fur trade).
19. Compare People's Gas Co. v. Tyner, 31 N.E. 59, 60 (Ind. 1892)
(petroleum products described as ferae naturae and subject to the rule of
capture by each surface owner), with Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 16
N.W.2d 510, 516 (Neb. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970) (surface
owner's respective rights adjusted to encourage secondary recovery of oil).
20. See Krier, supra note 16, at 335-39, 345 (arguing that property rights
do not arise automatically from the need to have them); cf. Gary D. Libecap,
Economic Variables and the Development of the Law: The Case of Western
Mineral Rights, in EMPIPICAL STUDIES IN INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 31, 57-58
(Lee J. Alston et al. eds., 1996) (concluding that legal changes defining

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

136

[Vol. 83:129

it is unlikely that there will be property without scarcity or
pressure; once again, these are necessary conditions, even if
not sufficient ones.
B. CHANGING COSTS OF PROPERTY
Now, let us turn to the cost side of establishing property
regimes. Among scarce resources, some are considerably
easier to turn into property than others. The law and
economics approach would suggest that those things that are
easiest to "propertize" would be likely to be propertized first,
all other things being equal.
Land is an extremely common subject of property rights,
and indeed land is the central metaphor for property itself.21 It
may be that one reason land is so central a subject of property
is because land is relatively easy to turn into property. 22 Land
stands still. You can put a fence around it or put up a sign on
it. You can see trespassers and try to expel them.
But other resources are much trickier and costlier to
reduce to property. Take water, for example: water moves
around, sometimes escaping into hidden locations.23 It cannot
be marked easily, and some of its most important usesnavigation, fish and wildlife habitat, natural power
generation-may leave few permanent signs on the water to
warn other takers of a prior or more valuable claim. Perhaps
as a consequence of all these factors, entitlements to water
resources often are embedded in much more elaborate property
regimes than are land rights; those regimes-such as irrigation
systems-may be communal or public in nature, and they may
entail many more intricate rights and duties among the
participants.

24

property rights in Nevada mining responded to increased efficiency gains
from such definitions); Dean Lueck, The Economic Nature of Wildlife Law, 18
J. LEGAL STUD. 291, 321 (1989) (concluding that legal institutions have
shaped wildlife ownership law in efficient ways).
21. See Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 329, 351 (1996) (comparing land and water as property metaphors).
22. See, e.g., J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES 61-62 (1968)
(comparing the ease of dividing land into parcels with the difficulty of dividing
air and water into parcels).
23. See Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. Ch. 1843) (describing
both invisibility and uncertainty of the location of subsurface water sources,
and using these characteristics as the reason for allowing landowners to take
water freely beneath their own property).
24. See generally SHui YAN TANG, INSTITUTIONS AND COLLECTIVE
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Parenthetically, the hotly contested "takings issues" in
American property law may in part result from the differential
costs of property regimes in different resources. If it is easy to
establish property in land, but much more difficult for such
land-adjacent resources as air, water and wildlife, then we may
expect to see landed property rights emerge prior to property
Landowners become
regimes in those other resources.
accustomed to regarding their land as their property, but they
simultaneously regard the adjacent air, water, and wildlife as
goods that are free for the taking-unowned goods that they
can "piggyback" onto their own land uses. 25 This pattern is
hardly a problem so long as landowners are widely dispersed
and their uses small in scale. But in the absence of property
rights to constrain their uses of the commons in air, water or
wildlife, these resources may be taken heedlessly. Indeed,
when overuse begins-when, say, smoke or pollution begins to
bother the neighbors or the public at large--courts often
develop a crude new form of property rights in the form of
nuisance law. A next step is likely to be more formal
regulation, which could be seen as an assertion of public rights
in previously unowned, but now pressured, common
resources. 26 For example, New York's first major zoning
ordinance in 1916, aimed in significant measure at preserving
light and air, was passed amidst the clamor that greeted the
massive new forty-story Equitable Building.2 7 In turn, such
regulatory initiatives may outrage landowners, who may think

ACTION: SELF-GOvERNANcE IN IRRIGATION (1992) (describing complexities of

community irrigation systems); Reed D. Benson, Whose Water Is It? Private
Rights and Public Authority Over Reclamation Project Water, 16 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 363, 367-68 (1997) and authorities cited therein (commenting on the
complexities of ownership of reclamation water); Joseph L. Sax, Rights that
"Inhere in the Title Itself': The Impact of the Lucas Case on Western Water
Law, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943, 944 (1993) (noting that rights in water law are
subject to changing public needs).
25. DALES, supra note 22, at 61-63; Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions
on Private Property, Public Rights, and the New Takings Legislation, 53
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265,272-74 (1996).
26. See DALES, supra note 22, at 63-65; Rose, supra note 25, at 274
(describing legislative regulation in response to the increasing frequency of
the nuisance action against pigsties in urban areas).
27. See SEYMOUR I. TOLL, ZONED AMERICA 48, 68-72, 180-83 (1969)
(discussing the 1915 Equitable Building, opposition to it, and the campaign for
zoning law regulating height as well as uses).
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that their "piggybacked" uses of adjacent shared resources are
28
a matter of right.
Of course, the costs of establishing property regimes are
not static. Among other things, those costs change with
technology. 29 As historians of the West have pointed out, the
invention of barbed wire made it easier to claim property in
land, although it is worth noting-a point to which I will
return later-that the new technology of barbed wire also
enabled the fence-installers to overreach, and to claim property
30
that actually belonged to others owners or to the public.
More recently, our newly invented (if still imperfect) methods
for monitoring and tracking air pollutants have enabled us
meaningfully to consider marketable emission rights that can
be traded among pollution sources. 31 Indeed, we could think
about governmental institutions as a species of technologythat is, administrative technology. Appropriative water rights,
for example, depend crucially upon the states' administrative
abilities to keep central records. 32 This is true of real estate
transactions as well; recording systems, for all their
vulnerability to the recent sabotage of self-styled "militiamen,"
nevertheless normally enable complete strangers to recognize
one another's property rights, and thus to finance deals and
organize purchases even from great distances. 33 Given all this,
28. See, e.g., Alyson C. Flournoy, PreservingDynamic Systems: Wetlands,
Ecology and Law, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 105, 105 n.1, 121-23 (1996)
(describing the wetlands' importance in flood control, water purification, and
wildlife conservation, but noting the constraining impact of the current
"property rights movement" on regulatory efforts to limit owners' filling of
wetlands).
29. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1330
(1993) (describing the economic prediction that enhanced technology for
boundary enforcement will lead to further enclosure).
30. See id.; see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 26 n.30
(1991) (describing historical literature on barbed wire); Wayne Gard, The Law
of the American West, in THE BOOK OF THE AMERICAN WEST 261, 292 (Jay
Monaghan ed., 1963) (describing the introduction of barbed wire); ERNEST
STAPLES OSGOOD, THE DAY OF THE CATTLEMAN 190 (1929) (describing the
introduction of barbed wire). Both Gard and Osgood observed that barbed
wire encouraged overreaching at the outset. See Gard, supra, at 192-93
(noting illegal enclosures); OSGOOD, supra, at 191-195 (additionally noting
conflicts over the enclosure of scarce water sources and public roads).
31. See State of Ohio v. EPA, 784 F.2d 224, 228-232, affd on reh'g, 798
F.2d 880, 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (describing new air pollution model, though
finding it insufficiently tested).
32. See JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES:
CASES AND MATERIALS 245-46 (2d ed. 1991).
33. See John L. McCormick, Torrens and Recording: Land Title
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it seems fair to predict that when there are changes in the
technological or administrative costs of establishing,
monitoring and trading property, there may well be changes in
property regimes as well: lower costs are likely to lead to a
proliferation of propertization-perhaps, however, including
some property claims that overreach.
C. THE LIMITED COMMONS AS A PROBLEM AREA
Property claims, of course, do not always take the
paradigmatic form of individual rights.
Sometimes the
physical characteristics of certain resources, taken together
with the limitations of human administration and technology,
make individual propertization difficult. Air and water were
already mentioned; these resources can indeed be organized
into at least partial regimes of individual entitlement, but only
with great expense and effort. Similarly, it is sometimes
difficult to turn large forests or ocean fisheries into individual
property. Often, if there are property regimes at all in these
resources, they may take the form either of public property or
communal property; they are a commons with respect to the
membership, but property with respect to outsiders.
Limited common property regimes (LCPs) have a quite
problematic place in the western legal tradition. We do indeed
have a number of devices for the creation and maintenance of
certain forms of LCP-condominiums, for example, where the
membership is specifically defined through purchase, and
where the rights, obligations and goals are more or less defined
in advance. But many LCPs are held together by custom
rather than private "constitutions."34 Their membership may
be defined on amorphous ex post criteria such as residence or
informal acceptance by existing members, and their practices
Assurance in the ComputerAge, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 61, 67-74, 115-28
(1992) (describing modem land recordation systems). For the "militias' use
of recording systems to clog land titles, see James Brooke, Officials Say
Montana 'Freemen' Collected $1.8 Million in Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,
1996, at Al (describing use of false liens filed on property of enemies). These
abuses of the recording system, incidentally, illustrate how greatly property
regimes depend on underlying systems of norms. See generally ELLICKSON,
supra note 30, at 184-206 (1991) (describing property norms of "close-knit
groups"); ROSE, supra note 16, at 125-26 (1994) (describing historic national
norms relating to property).
34. Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions,73 CORNELL L. REv.
906, 906 (1988) (analogizing systems of private land use controls to
"constitutions").

140

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:129

and goals, if definable at all, may be subject to subtle shifts
and redirections. These features mean that they often modify
the traditional trappings of individual property. For example,
a communal fishery may not allow the members to alienate
their shares. James Acheson has described at length some
informal communal property regimes among Maine lobster
fisheries, and his work demonstrates that membership in a
fishing community cannot be transferred smoothly to
outsiders, but rather rests heavily on a web of connectionslong residence, kinship and local friendships, proven skill, and
acceptance of local norms.3 5 Similarly, an LCP may modify the
vaunted right to exclude; members of the community instead
may be expected to share their gains when things go well for
themselves but not so well for their neighbors. That was a part
of the tradition of the potlatch among Native Americans of the
Pacific Northwest, whose members shared the norms of an
extended set of fishing communities. 36
Perhaps because of these modifications of the traditional
trappings of property, the western legal tradition has
historically had a certain cultural myopia about the many nonindividual forms of property in the limited commons. That is,
many limited common property regimes do not look like
property at all to us, and we have tended to ignore them.37
There are some economic reasons for doing so, of course;
communal regimes tend to be quite complex internally, and
they are more unwieldy than individual property, particularly
with respect to questions of alienability. Their amorphousness
as to membership raises issues of who belongs, who does not,
and for what purposes; there are yet other issues when the
LCP regime changes direction over time-when fishers change
their target from one species to another, or when farmers shift
from one irrigation technology to another. These and other
factors mean that, in a limited commons, claims of entitlement
may be more difficult to recognize, monitor, transfer, and
enforce.
But there is a second and sometimes overlapping reason
why property consciousness may lapse with respect to
communal claims: communal claims are frequently made by
35. JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 63-70 (1988).
36. See D. Bruce Johnsen, The Formation and Protection of Property
Rights Among the Southern Kwakiutl Indians, 15 J. LEGAL STuD. 41, 41-42
(1986).
37. See ROSE, supra note 16, at 18-19, 294-96.
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what seem to be persons that are somehow deemed
inappropriate to make claims of entitlement. Such social
notions of the "propriety" of property-ownership have been
more widespread than it might seem, sometimes coming from
self-conscious decisions, but sometimes from what is perceived
as "nature." Until the later nineteenth century, our ideas of
the correct ordering of the family relegated married women
(along with slaves) to propertilessness, while our concern for
"domestic privacy" has continued to curtail women's
entitlements vis-h-vis spouses, particularly with respect to
bodily integrity.3 8 Similarly, the inability of gays and lesbians
to marry constrains their ability to dispose of property as they
39
choose.
In LCPs, both factors-unconventional communal claims
and unrecognized social status--overlap and conspire against
property recognition. Historically, this was perhaps most
noticeable in European encounters with Native Americans.
Although it is overly romantic to regard Native Americans as
consistent conservationists, many of their practices
nevertheless did conserve and enhance resources. No matter:
we all too often feared and condemned American Natives at the
same time that we overlooked the ways that they managed
their various resource bases. For example, like other Native
Americans, tribal peoples in New England used fire very
extensively to clear the land and to encourage new browse for
the wildlife they hunted. 40 The Puritans held earnest
discussions about whether the Indians' fire practices were
enough to mark out their territory as property; they decided
that the answer was no-although to the Puritans' credit, they
at least discussed the subject,4 1 and in fact some compensation
to the tribes was routinely a part of the New England

38. Reva Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2153 (1996). More recent legal doctrines
similarly undermine women's legal rights to be free of violence. See id. at
2200-02 (discussing federalism constraints on the interpretation of the
Violence Against Women Act).
39. See WiLLiAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
66-68 (1996).
40. See generally STEPHEN J. PYNE, FIRE IN AMERICA: A CULTURAL
HISTORY OF WILDLAND AND RURAL FIRE 47-51 (1982) (describing Eastern

tribes' fire practices).
41. See WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND 56-58 (1983) (describing
Puritan debates over whether Native Americans could claim property through
fire and other practices).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:129

expansion on the frontier. 42 In other encounters, particularly
as settlement pushed out toward the more nomadic tribal
groups of the West, settlers far more summarily dismissed
43
Native American practices that might constitute property.
This is not the only history in which our property concepts
have failed with respect to indigenous peoples' claims. Just as
we disregarded the role of indigenous North Americans' fire
regimes, Europeans have disregarded the ways that other
elaborate indigenous customs preserved fisheries and forests,"
just as they failed to acknowledge that native artisans and
storytellers were producing creative artworks.4 5 Not
understanding or appreciating these practices and their
products, we did not treat them as creating property rights;
instead, we stopped the fire regimes, 46 impeded the customary
practices, 47 and appropriated the artworks. 48 Notice that at
42. See JOHN FREDERICK MARTIN, PROFITS IN THE WILDERNESS:
ENTREPRENUERsHIP AND THE FOUNDING OF NEw ENGLAND TOWNS IN THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 9, 151 (1991) (describing land purchases from the

Indians as a prerequisite to New England town settlements).
43. See Johnson v. M Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 567-71 (1823)
(restating the defendant's argument that Indians did not own property); see
also Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney, Raid or Trade? An Economic
Model of Indian-White Relations, 37 J.L. & ECON. 39, 61-64 (1994) (arguing
that the pattern of negotiation broke down as settlers moved west and
encountered less sedentary tribes); Rosemary J. Coombe, Authorial
Cartographies:Mapping Proprietary Borders in a Less-Than-Brave New
World, 48 STAN. L. REV.1357, 1362 (1996) (observing European and American
"insistence"that natives were mobile hunters rather than agriculturalists).
44. See, e.g., Robert Higgs, Legally Induced Technical Regress in the
Washington Salmon Fishery, in EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE, supra note 20, at 247, 250-52 (describing settlers' abandonment of
the efficient Native American fishing regime).
45. See Coombe, supra note 43, at 1360. For an expanded version of her
argument,

see

ROSEMARY

J.

COOMBE,

CULTURAL

APPROPRIATIONS:

AUTHORSHIP, ALTERITY AND THE LAW (in press, Duke Univ. Press, 1997).
46. See generally PYNE, supra note 40, at 163-80 (describing systematic
efforts to stop forest fires).
47. See Johnsen, supra note 36, at 46-47 (describing Canadian attempts
to halt potlatch); ARTHUR MCEVOY, THE FISHERMAN'S PROBLEM 47 (1986)
(describing the California goldminers' destruction of salmon breeding waters
as a major source of conflict between natives and settlers).
48. See, e.g., Lenora Ledwon, Native American Life Stories and
"Authorship":Legal and Ethical Issues, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 76 (1996)
(noting "new age" appropriations of Native American artifacts, musical
instruments, and ceremonies); see also Christine Haight Farley, Protecting
Folklore of Indigenous Peoples:Is IntellectualProperty the Answer?, 30 CONN.
L. REV. 1, 4-9 (1997) (describing egregious instance of unauthorized
commercial use of Aboriginal Australian artwork as one of many
appropriations of indigenous art).
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least some of this pattern could easily be characterized as a
redistribution from producers to vandals, thieves and
freeloaders-hardly an efficient outcome, even putting fairness
questions to one side.
Some progress has undoubtedly been made on these
fronts, slow though it may be. I will return to this subject, but
for now, I want simply to flag the phenomenon: certain
property claims do not make it onto our property radar screen,
or appear only dimly there. At best this pattern creates an
imbalance in favor of the kinds of claims that we do recognize,
while at worst it may foster violence and dissipate wealth.
Hence some part of the future of property may revolve around
recognizing as property the resource management of previously
unnoticed groups. Indeed, we should expect to see more
property if and when we can overcome these myopias-that is,
if we come to recognize that some previously invisible
community has resource interests and management practices
of its own.
Summing up so far, the conventional economic story
suggests that we may predict alterations in property-and
specifically, more refined property-under certain conditions.
The first condition is that social interest increases in some
subject, so that we gain greater benefits if we use property to
manage conflict and encourage investment. The second
condition concerns costs: we should expect to see more refined
property where technological or administrative advances make
it cheaper for us to organize property regimes. But the third
condition is cultural and to some degree political: we may also
expect to see some changes in property simply from taking
notice of unconventional forms of property, or property among
previously under-acknowledged persons and groups-which
sometimes amounts to the same thing.
D. Too MUCH PROPERTY?
With all these guideposts staked out to the future of
property, I now turn to two specific subject matter areas that
may suggest the directions that property could take in the
future. These are not subjects within the usual canon of
property law, and they appear only marginally, if at all, in
first-year property textbooks. Nevertheless, they are subjects
on which property discussions have been quite heated in recent
years, and it is for this reason that they may give some clue
about the more general trends for property law. The first of
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these subjects is the role of property in cyberspace, where there
is considerable discussion of the need for new forms of private
property, particularly in order to encourage the development of
new intellectual and commercial products. But in cyberspace
as in intellectual property more generally, there is but also a
quite vociferous claim that there is "too much property" and a
spirited attack on the idea that property should reign at all in
that domain. The second subject is environmental law, which
in recent years has proved to be a prolific source of new types
of property, particularly some species of hybrid, regulatorilycreated property rights in pollution control and resource
preservation. Here too, however, there has been a strong
undercurrent of dissent, an argument that there is "too much
property" in environmental matters; but here the proposed
solutions are generally not a return to the unmanaged
commons, but rather various continuations and refinements of
centralized command and control ordering.
In both cyberspace and environmental law, however, a
further undercurrent suggests that the most intriguing and
potentially most fruitful direction for property regimes lies in
the areas of limited common property-the often-ignored
regimes that we might consider "property on the outside,
commons on the inside." I will argue in the conclusion that
adaptation to accommodate limited common property regimes
may be one of the most important challenges facing our
property law.
II. PROPERTY AND THE NET
Intellectual property has become the Dodge City of
property-wild and out of control but wonderfully exciting and
innovative. Throughout the world, tremendous wealth is now
tied up in intellectual property. Not only is the ownership of
that property sharply contested, 49 however, but there is an
even more fundamental attack on the notion that intellectual
matters should be reduced to property at all. This is a quite
striking contrast to more conventional areas of property,
notably in that quintessential subject of property, land. With
land, the view that resources should remain open to
49. See, e.g., John E. Giust, Noncompliance with TRIPs by Developed and
Developing Countries:Is TRIPs Working?, 8 IND. INTL & COMP. L. REV. 69,
94-95 (1997) (noting that developing countries traditionally resist strong
intellectual property protections on ground that such protections favor more
developed countries and limit access to technology).
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unconstrained common entry is extremely limited; only in
quite special circumstances does unrestricted public use of
land seem to result in "comedy"-that is, a happy and
productive outcome-rather than "tragedy."50 Intellectual
property scholars, on the other hand, have long and heatedly
debated whether or when the goal of this field-the
encouragement of useful creativity-is better served by
treating intellectual productivity as property, or (at least to
some degree) as part of a commons that is open to all comers.5 1
Indeed, a very considerable part of the thinking about
intellectual property involves an effort to find an appropriate
balance between property and commons.
Not surprisingly, the phenomenal development of
computerized communication has had an impact on this
debate, and on intellectual property generally. Indeed, it
seems inevitable that the "information superhighway" must
cause some rethinking of intellectual property law. Among
other things, cyberspace activity makes the traditional
category of "exclusion--so central to property of all kindsmore problematic, because, on the net, it is much more difficult
to monitor copying, or even to say what copying is.52

50. Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711, 711-14 (1986). Property
most needful for commerce is a traditional candidate for publicness, see id. at
774-77, but in recent years there have been arguments for recreation and
speech as foundations of public property, see id. at 774-81, as well as
ecosystem preservation, see Alison Rieser, EcologicalPreservationas a Public
Property Right: An Emerging Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 15 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 402, 418-26 (1991).
5L See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District:
Observations on the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359, 373-74
(1992) (arguing that inventiveness is not appropriately represented as a
limited resource or zero-sum game, but rather as a positive sum game). A
much more extreme view of the public nature of ideas was once common. See
Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal
Conditions of the Emergence of the "Author",17 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY STUD.
425, 434 (1984) (describing a view, prevalent until the late eighteenth century,
that an author was a mere craftsman transcribing ideas already in the public
domain, and by extension, an author's work was in the public domain as well).
52. Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a
Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1293, 1333-34 (noting
that computers raise ambiguity between copying and reading); see also
Margaret Chon, New Wine BurstingFrom Old Bottles: Collaborative Internet
Art, Joint Works, and Entreprenuership,75 OR. L. REv. 257, 259-66 (1996).
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A. CYBERSPACE: NOT ENOUGH PROPERTY, OR Too MUCH?

As Keith Aoki has observed, there seems to be something
of a disagreement among intellectual property scholars
whether cyberspace utterly demolishes the existing structure
of intellectual property or simply necessitates some minor
tinkering at the fringes. 53 Jessica Litman notes that the
"merely tinkering" school argues from historical continuity:
their position is that intellectual property categories have
easily adjusted to the major telecommunications advances over
the course of the century. 54 From that perspective,
computerized communications can just be chalked up with
radio, movies and television; those media too no doubt gave
occasion for dire predictions, but intellectual property found
room for them all. Yet Litman herself disputes the seamless
assimilation of new technology to existing categories of
intellectual property, and she and others make a strong case
that new forms of computer creativity particularly challenge
the categories and metaphors of standard intellectual property
law.55 Perhaps it is no surprise that the two sides of this
dispute roughly track the opposing schools of "not enough
property" versus "too much property" in cyberspace.
1. "Not Enough Property." Most notorious among the
productions of the "not enough property" school is the 1995
report of the Information Infrastructure Task Force, a writing
commonly known as the White Paper. This report not only
calls for an extension of copyright law principles into
cyberspace, but argues that only relatively minor adjustments
are required to perform this task.56 The White Paper's
53. See Aoki, supra note 52, at 1305-08 (contrasting the views of John
Perry Barlow and Jane C. Ginsburg).
54. Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68
OR. L. REV. 275, 276-77 (1989) (contrasting optimistic and pessimistic views
about copyright law's ability to assimilate new technology).
55. See id.; see also Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerningthe
Legal Protectionof ComputerPrograms,94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2343, 234748, 2365 (1994) (arguing that the existing intellectual property law categories
are unsuited with respect to software). Interestingly, these authors argue
that one of the principle sources of value in new software is metaphor, such as
the metaphor of the page in word processing. See id. at 2334.
56. Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the
National Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on
Intellectual Property Rights 17 (last modified Nov. 15, 1995)
<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii> [hereinafter White Paper].
But see Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED MAG., Jan. 1996, at
134 (arguing that the White Paper's proposed adjustments are in reality
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normative claim deploys the standard argument that property
encourages labor and trade: cyberproperty allows individuals
to market the fruits of their creativity, thus permitting them to
reap the gains from their creative processes; simultaneously,
property makes marketing activities attractive, thus promoting
57
even greater dissemination of information and ideas.
Conversely, open access is to be eschewed: in an open access
regime, people who have valuable information will be likely to
withhold it, simply because they cannot exclude others from
appropriating their ideas and intellectual efforts.
This, of course, is a point that could have been made
several centuries ago about the violin makers of Cremona.
Since the creators of those fabulously tuneful instruments
could not protect their methods through property rights, they
tried to protect them through secrecy. They succeeded all too
well, so that their fabled techniques went with them to the
grave, to the immense frustration of future generations of
musicians. 58 That story, of course, reinforces the point that
property-including most especially the right to exclude-does
not necessarily encourage creators to hoard ideas to
themselves. Quite the contrary, it is the absence of property
that leads to hoarding, secrecy, and evasion. And, of course,
property's protection of the right to exclude is intimately linked
to incentives to invest and disseminate valuable intellectual
creations, because the right to exclude allows the creator to
charge for the things that she makes available to others. 59
With respect specifically to the Internet, Margaret Radin
has elaborated on a related point about information quality:
major extensions of copyright law, limiting earlier patterns of free use and
requiring major intrusions into existing cyberspace practice). For other
challenges to the White Paper, see Keith Aoki, Foreword: Innovation and the
Information Environment: Interrogatingthe Entrepreneur,75 OR. L. REV. 1,
12-13 (1996).
57. See White Paper,supra note 56, at 10-11.
58. See Barbara Jepson, It Is No Disgrace to Be Second Fiddle to a
Stradivarius, SMITHSONIAN MAG., Oct. 1990, at 160 (describing modern
efforts to recreate the lost secrets of Cremona violin production).
59. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 558
(1985) (stating that the marketable right to use one's expression gives
incentive to "create and disseminate ideas," comporting with the Framers'
intent for copyright law); see also Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent
Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 318, 342 (1992) (noting that
patents reduce the need for secrecy); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and
Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 275-80 (1977) (arguing
that patents encourage investment and lessen the need for secrecy).
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she argues that if information on the net is an entirely free
good, with open access to all, then net information is likely to
devolve into something akin to advertising, or more
specifically, infomercials. 60 That is, the net content will very
largely slide toward information that someone is attempting to
foist on the viewer-partisan, untrustworthy, and thin in
usable content.
Aside from concerns over the creation, dissemination, and
maintenance of high quality intellectual products in
cyberspace, a different but related argument for property
concerns unwanted intrusions. There is a considerable
efflorescence of "anti-property" on the Internet. Vandals try to
get into other people's files so that they can destroy them; false
message-senders conceal their identity and masquerade as
others; criminals attempt to secure access to personal financial
and health data of individuals. To be sure, some of these
activities seem to be quite liberating. Apparently one of the
glories of the "alt.sex" channels is that the user can pretend to
be anyone at all, of any age, race, religion, or persuasion; all
characteristics are candidates for choice in a kind of invention
of the self, or indeed of a group of alternative selves. 61
Liberating or not, however, the net's opportunities for
deception and intrusion can turn into serious abuses,
undermining the net's value as a medium of communication.
Sexual predators are perhaps the most striking of the
Internet's potential for abuse, but there are many more
varieties. 62 Computerized embezzlers make the net less usable
for commercial purposes; blackmailers, snoops, and virusspreaders may frighten ordinary citizens off the net altogether,
leaving them to hide in their own private and unconnected
60. Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. &
COM. 509, 522 (1996).
61. See Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean, 15
J.L. & COM. 395, 407-09 (1996) (discussing the possibility and the implications
of "alternative personae" on the Internet ); see also Curtis E.A. Karnow, The
Encrypted Self. Fleshing Out the Rights of Electronic Personalities, 13 J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1 (1994) (suggesting a new legal fiction, the "electronic
personality" or "eper"). But see Katherine Franke, Cunning Stunts: From
Hegemony to Desire; a Review of Madonna's Sex, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 549, 570 n.115 (1993-94) (describing cybersex participants' anxieties
over being fooled by gender imposters). This is particularly interesting
because the chosen forum highlights anonymous fantasy. See id.
62. See Jon Jefferson, Deleting Cybercrooks, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1997, at 68
(describing a variety of criminal activities on the Internet and the efforts of
the criminal justice system to react).
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computers. Any such retreats of course reinforce the point that
the ability to exclude can expand a sociable exchange of
information, whereas the inability to exclude can shrink these
desirable activities. Indeed, even the relatively innocuous false
message senders, the self-inventors as it were, can undermine
trust in all the other information on the net.63 There is a kind
of "market for lemons" at work here: if liars have an easy time
of it, then even truthful people cannot easily reassure others of
the quality of their messages.6 4
Given the disadvantages of complete open access on the
net, but given also the current difficulties of policing access to
and use of the net's resources, it not surprising that there is
great interest in what we might think of as Internet barbed
wire fences, both legal and technological. On the technological
side, encryption is already a growth industry, and sure to
remain one for the foreseeable future. Encryption raises
problems of its own, 65 but it also illustrates the impact of
technology on property: encryption can increase the property
aspects of cyberspace, because it lessens the expense of the
classic right to exclude.
I As to legal barbed wire, the White Paper merely
encapsulates a number of recent calls for an enhancement of
the administrative technology devoted to securing effective
property rights in Internet products. These include not only
sharpened forms of intellectual property and legal bolstering
for encryption efforts, 66 but also more sophisticated criminal
and civil litigation strategies to prevent privacy violations and
preserve confidential information. 67 Indeed, the heated debate
63. See Froomkin, supra note 61, at 402-407 (discussing several ways that
anonymity on the Internet can undermine trust and result in greater
surveillance); cf. id. at 407-411 (discussing advantages of anonymity in
preserving privacy).
64. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 495-96 (1970) (discussing the
negative effects of dishonest dealing on a market).
65. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Role of Private Groups in Public Policy:
Cryptography and the National Research Council, 38 OCCASIONAL PAPER
FROM THE LAW SCHOOL, U. CHi. L. SCH., 7-11 (1996) (discussing law
enforcement and national security issues regarding encryption).
66. See White Paper, supra note 56, at 211-20, 230-34 (recommending
expansion of copyright law to include technology aimed at protecting
intellectual property on the Internet). But see Samuelson, supra note 56, at
135 (criticizing potential effects of White Paper's suggestions).
67. See Nina Bernstein, On Frontierof Cyberspace, Data Is Money, and a
Threat, N.Y. TIMEs, June 12, 1997, at Al (stating that a woman sued a
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over the White Paper suggests that even the foes of
cyberproperty think that these legal protections could have
some effective bite.
2. "Too Much Property." There is another side to this
argument, however. Like the proponents of cyberproperty, the
opponents-the "too much property" school-take up both
positive and normative arguments. On the positive side, antipropertarians sometimes make what Lawrence Lessig
somewhat skeptically calls the "argument from futility": 68 that
is, they claim that it is pointless to try to create legal property
in cyberspace. David Johnson and David Post, for example,
stress not only the ease of copying via computer, but also the
difficulties that governments have in policing Internet use;
evaders, they argue, can shift their work not only from location
to location within any national jurisdiction but from place to
place around the globe.6 9 Political obstacles make it difficult to
change that situation: governments do not now agree on
rigorous uniform standards to protect intellectual property in
cyberspace, particularly given what are perceived as
distributional inequities in the adoption of conventional
western intellectual property. 0 Even if this impasse ultimately
proves to be only temporary, the Internet's erosion of national
legal boundaries today harks back to the fragmented legal
culture faced by eighteenth-century German authors, who also
could not protect their works from being copied in a multitude
of other jurisdictions, and who-as Martha Woodmansee
argues in a much-cited work-effectively invented a cult of

telemarketing firm for violation of privacy and for allowing her questionnaire
responses to be entered in computer files by prisoners, one of whom later used
the information in contacting her); see also Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1403, 1408-09 (1996) (noting incipient legal
effort to control access and create metaphoric boundaries in cyberspace).
68. Lessig, supra note 67, at 1405 (describing the standard arguments
marshaled against expanding traditional copyright protection in cyberspace).
69. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1370-78 (1996). But cf. Lessig, supra
note 67, at 1404-09 (expressing skepticism over these arguments).
70. See Aoki, supra note 52, at 1340-45 (describing the difficulty of
arriving at common standards for cyberspace and the distributional
unevenness of universalizing the Western standard of "romantic authorship");
see also Pamela Samuelson, Big Media Beaten Back, WIRED MAG., Mar. 1997,
at 61 (describing the rejection of White Paper's approach in an international
copyright conference).
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genius to give some simulacrum of property in their
71
intellectual productions.
In modern copyright law, the cult of genius has turned into
what has come to be known as the "author principle," and one
of the most interesting current anti-property arguments in
cyberspace takes the form of an attack on this very principle.
Some critics attribute author- or inventor-centrism to excessive
romanticism about the lone individual's ability to create
intellectual goods ex nihilo.72 But their more fundamental
charge is that property rights in cyberspace fragment what
should be seen as an integrated whole. Rosemary Coombe, for
example, in writing about intellectual property in cyberspace,
contends that much of the intellectual creativity incorporated
in any given production derives from the contributions of vast
numbers of persons, coming from very different statuses and
cultures; but the "author principle" pretends that some
73
particular individual may take credit for the whole.
Moreover, she and others claim that this pattern has serious
distributional consequences: the extension of the author or
inventor principle privileges the contributions of the
industrialized West over those of non-Western cultures, among
other matters by rejecting intellectual property status for
folklore or for carefully cultivated plant products from thirdworld agrarian groups. 74 The implication of these charges is

71. Woodmansee, supra note 51, at 425-26, 438-39, 443-45 (describing the
nascent recognition of authors of tangible property).
72. See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF
COPYRIGHT 125-28 (1993) (describing eighteenth century rhetoric of authorial
creative genius); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression:
Equality and Individualismin the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102
YALE L.J. 1533, 1544-48 (1993) (describing natural rights claim to ownership
of things one creates); Wendy J. Gordon & Sam Postbrief, On Commodifying
Intangibles, 10 YALE J.L. & HUmAN. 135, 142 (1998) (reviewing James Boyle's
book Shamans, Software and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the
Information Society that describes authorial debt to other authors).
73. Rosemary Coombe, Left Out on the Information Highway, 75 OR. L.
REV. 237, 246 (1996) (using the example of uncopyrighted African designs
woven into copyrighted American textiles).
74. See id. at 245-47; see also Rosemary J. Coombe, The Properties of
Culture and the Politics of Possession Identity: Native Claims in the Cultural
Appropriation Controversy, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 249, 280-84 (1993)
(discussing the mismatch between western property categories and Native
American cultural claims); Shayana Kadidal, Plants, Poverty, and
Pharmaceutical Patents, 103 YALE L.J. 223 (1993) (suggesting a more
equitable intellectual property regime to protect less developed countries'
biological materials); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The
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that author- or inventor-centrism is inappropriate even from
the central perspective of property's underlying rationale;
propertization via the author principle effectively allows some
to appropriate the efforts of others.
On the other hand, property theory also suggests reasons
for the attraction of author- and inventor-centrism, as well as
the closely-related focus on originality. Relative to other
candidates for property, the author principle is easy; and, as in
most other kinds of property, the easy things get propertized
first. It is easier to identify a single author (or definite set of
authors) than an amorphous group, like a "village"; it is easier
to identify a sharply unusual intellectual product than one
that builds incrementally on the ideas of others, like a folktale;
it is easier to mark out a product of sudden innovation than a
gradual modification of nature, like a village's long-cultivated
plant product.7 5
But easy or not, the answer is that the author principle,
together with the analogous inventor principle in patent law,
represents a kind of partial propertization-like the rangeland,
where some uses can deploy barbed wire but others cannot.
Some things get treated as property, some things do not; some
persons get treated as owners, some do not. The effect of
partial propertization is that non-propertized contributions can
be expropriated or ignored, or both. Conflicts inevitably ensue,
and it is small wonder that one branch of the attack on the
author principle is the claim that "too much property" leads to
strife and litigiousness rather than creativity, peace, and the
encouragement of effort.7 6
Insofar as the critique of the author principle is an
argument against partial propertization, it is in some ways
ambiguous; it is not clear that this argument eschews property
in principle, or whether its proponents in theory could be
satisfied by a more complete extension of property rights to
currently unpropertized materials made by previously
Appropriation of the Scientific and Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and
Local Communities, 17 MICH. J. INTL L. 919, 929-47 (1996) (stating that
western intellectual property concepts deny protection to indigenous plant
and animal uses).
75. Cf. Kadidal, supra note 74, at 228-29 (stating that intellectual
property regimes undervalue indigenous traditional breeding practices that
form a basis for western commercial seeds); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 74, at
936-40 (describing the patent system's favoritism to sharply defined
innovative steps over gradual communal accretions of knowledge).
76. Cf. Boyle, supra note 9, at 133-34.
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unrecognized contributors. If the latter, then what appears to
be a claim of "too much property" could in principle turn into
its opposite: "too little property."
But there is no such ambiguity in a rather different
antiproperty argument, one particularly associated with the
Internet and popularized under the slogan "[ilnformation
wants to be free"77-a slogan now particularly targeting the
White Paper's proposals for cyberproperty.7 8 From the outset
of the Internet, a considerable number of users have asserted
not only that the net is loose, open, amorphous, and
uncontrollable, but that it ought to have those characteristics.
The most important consideration here seems to be a vision of
intellectual activity as interactive and mutually synergistic. If
that is the nature of intellectual activity-and the structure of
university education suggests that to some degree many of us
think that it is-then those engaged in intellectual creations
should want more open entry rather than less. The normal
rationing function of property and pricing would be out of place
here, because ideas are not scarce goods in the same sense as,
say, coffee beans. Intellectual activities are rather goods whose
number and value is enhanced with more entry, more use; if
particular innovations are walled off and payment is required
for access, the sum of innovation will decline. The White Paper
controversy thus represents one battle in the more general and
longstanding contest of property versus commons in
intellectual property. The modem defenders of an open
Internet take the position that the free exchange of ideas is a
kind of comedy of the commons, where total creativity is
enhanced by open access and interaction among all entrants'
ideas. 79 Hence the net, they argue, is an inappropriate vehicle
for property's exclusive rights; instead, it is in its best form as
an open access regime.
3. A Mixed Regime? Clearly, the startling "big bang" of
cyberspace has reopened longstanding issues of property
77. For a brief history of this mantra, described as "[tihe motto of the
hacker world," see Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPs Agreement: Imperialistic,
Outdated and Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 613, 625 n.30 (1996).
78. See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 OR. L. REV.
299, 305-07 (1996) (arguing that the White Paper's proposals would alter
Internet use without the traditional protections for open access); Samuelson,

supra note 70, at 134-35.

79. See, e.g., Richard Stallman, Reevaluating Copyright: The Public Must
Prevail, 75 OR. L. REV. 291 (1996) (arguing that the current copyright laws
inhibit innovation and creativity).
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versus commons in the world of ideas. Some availability of the
classic property right to exclude, whether technologically or
legally created, unquestionably has positive social benefits in
cyberspace, from the point of view of the privacy, accuracy, and
usefulness of the net as an information vehicle. On the other
hand, where the legal effort to delineate property rights
substantially outstrips the technological means, there are some
expediential arguments against property too. Sufficiently
nuanced forms of property would cost a great deal to create and
enforce; but insufficiently nuanced forms, as the critics of the
White Paper point out, would encourage (and have already
encouraged) a scramble to stake out claims, along with
litigation, litigation, litigation. In short, the creation of "too
much property" in cyberspace can be administratively costly
and socially counterproductive, creating strife and waste
rather than peace and fruitful labor. This expediential critique
is, of course, a kind of transaction cost analysis-important but
perhaps less intriguing than the argument that the commons
positively promotes creativity, by inviting inventive minds to
play with one another's ideas.8 0
Ultimately, one might guess that the net will tend to
divide into at least two arenas, one propertized and the other
public. The propertized portion may be more useful, linear,
and directed, where users can make a computer card payment
without worrying about computer thieves; or make a date with
someone with reasonable confidence about the other person's
identity; or pay to watch a movie or hear a concert, in an
environment in which the right to exclude permits the sender
to charge for the service, and thus encourages the sender to
make the movie or concert available in the first place.
But in the latter arena, one might envision a public space
that is full of junk, trash, lies, and risks, but also excitement
and thrills-like Central Park after dark.81 It is important to
80. These critiques are interestingly combined, in the context of genetic
research, in Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation?, 280 SCI. 698, 698-99 (1998) (arguing that excessive patents in
genetic research can create an "anticommons" in which multiple rights block
unified research). See also Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transitionfrom Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 622, 677

(1998) (describing "anticommons" in which excessive property rights block
resource below a level that is socially optimal).

81. See David M. Herszenhorn, For CentralPark'sLate Shift, Darkness is
Lure, Not Threat, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1997, at Al (describing late-night
subculture in Central Park after dark as gatherings for roller-skating,
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have such a public space. This commons is not purely tragic;
creativity thrives not only on the ability to cash in on one's
ideas-an ability that one gets from property-but also on a
kind of free-wheeling give and take that we derive from open
access and public space. 82 Traditional intellectual property law
has generally incorporated some mixture of property and
commons, relying on such doctrines as "fair use" in copyright
and relying also on the larger climate of First Amendment
claims that modify intellectual property law.8 3 Whatever the
technological differences from other forms of intellectual
property, the Internet too appears to call for some balance of
property and commons.
B. THE CASE FOR LIMITED COMMON PROPERTIES
The debate over Internet property in many ways replicates
longstanding tensions between private property and public
space in the intellectual realm. But the growth of cyberspace
communication has also begun to stimulate discussion of a
different kind. That discussion revolves around the need to
foster and protect what I have been calling limited common
property-a regime that holds some resource as a commons
among a group of "insiders," but as an exclusive right against
"outsiders"-commons on the inside, property on the outside.
In the cyberspace context, the discussion of limited
common properties (LCPs) is still at an early stage, much of it
playing out over the subject of informal norms. Internet usage
clearly has already generated a tremendous informal culture
among users, including behavioral norms as well as language.
As a kind of clincher to the "futility" argument against
cyberproperty, some authors have argued that property is not
only impossible but also unnecessary on the Internet, because
the work of formal property can be done by these informal
norms. Johnson and Post, for example, draw an analogy to
communities of medieval merchants, who enforced commercial
norms among themselves; similarly, these authors say,
Internet users police one another's bad behavior by various

drinking, and socializing despite the perceived danger).
82. See Boyle, supra note 9, at 98-103 (discussing arguments that creative
endeavors may be encouraged by public access as well as privatization).
83. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information

Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 39-40 (1996) (noting widespread public norms that run
contrary to formal copyright law and enforce only commercial exploitations).
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tactics of ostracism and disapproval, including such vividlynamed practices as "flaming" and "mailbombing. 84
This claim has met with skepticism among other writers.
Among other things, the analogy may not be entirely apt.
Medieval traders dealt with one another over long periods of
time and had many opportunities to take stock of one another;
some shared relationships on a number of fronts, including
religion, family, and place of origin, giving them many
opportunities for mutual enforcement of trading norms.85
Margaret Radin points out that while such norms for selfpolicing might have been viable in "early cyberspace," when
the net users shared an outlook and were limited in numbers,
such norms may be much less viable in the mass-entry
environment of "late cyberspace;" 86 in that context, she says, it
remains to be seen whether a laissez-faire regime alone will
produce the means to protect user groups sufficiently, 87 or
whether certain kinds of uses might require more formal
protection than the users can carve out for themselves.
Finally, it is not entirely clear in what direction norms
may lead; indeed, they could conceivably lead straight back to
individual property. If the intellectual property historians are
correct, the much-decried author- and inventor-centrism of our
intellectual property law itself derives from an informal norm:
in the absence of effective formal copyright law, authors

84. Johnson & Post, supra note 69, at 1388-91 (arguing that cyberspace
users can develop internal norms comparable to medieval "law merchant");
see also Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, No Regulation, Government Regulation,or
Self-Regulation: Social Enforcement or Social Contracting of Governance in
Cyberspace, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 475, 509-23 (1997) (describing
Internet users' methods for self-governance).
85. See Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade:
Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857, 875-81 (1989)
(describing Maghribi medieval traders who were in a defined group with
substantial sources of information about one another; also describing Italian
merchants' organization in family units); see also Gibbons, supra note 84, at
520-23 (noting the lack of multidimensional relationships on the Internet as a
problem for the enforcement of norms, but also observing that some Internet
users become "residents" susceptible to social enforcement).
86. Radin, supra note 60, at 516; see also Gibbons, supra note 84, at 52021 (noting additional problems of anonymity and heterogeneity of net users).
But see id. at 509-23 (describing a variety of technological and norm-based
techniques for policing outsider intrusion and insider misbehavior in Internet
groups).
87. See Radin, supra note 60, at 525.
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themselves cultivated a norm recognizing "genius," in order to
protect their own literary efforts. 88
In any event, these discussions of norms link cyberspace to
the subject of the limited commons. In most contexts, norms
are associated with relatively small communities- close-knit
groups," as they are called by Robert Ellickson, one of the
leading contemporary theorists of norms.89 Within such closeknit user groups, the exchange of information and ideas might
well benefit from organization as LCPs. Discussions among
mathematicians, musicians, or even Scrabble players might
well be more productive if the participants could join a
discussion that was completely free-wheeling among
themselves internally-subject, of course to their own
agreements and norms-but limited in such as way as to
exclude vandals and tyros.90 In physical spaces held as LCPs,
informal norms and user-created enforcement techniques may
go some distance toward self-policing and perimeter defense, 91
and in various segments of cyberspace too, users may police
themselves by informal norms-norms of a given profession,
for example, or of a common interest, or of a shared body of
knowledge. Nevertheless, external intrusions are a problem;
the very amorphousness that makes individual property
difficult in cyberspace undoubtedly makes LCPs susceptible to
interlopers as well, and hence limited commons groups might
benefit from legal protections for their joint efforts.
Along those lines, Robert Merges has urged that
intellectual property law should encourage limited common
productivity by positively nurturing contractual regimes
among intellectual property rights-holders, who in turn can
develop internal norms for their own internal relationships. 92
88. See Woodmansee, supra note 51, at 438-39, 443-47 (describing the
relation of an absence of intellectual property to discussions of "genius" in
Germany); ROSE, supra note 72, at 124-28 (detailing discussions of originality
and genius advanced in England to protect literary works).
89. ELLLICKSON, supra note 30, at 177-83 (1991).
90. See Robert P. Merges, PropertyRights Theory and the Commons: The
Case of Scientific Research, 13 SOc. PHIL. & POLY 145, 162-63 (1996)
(describing how scientific research and discovery is furthered by internal
common access when coupled with group norms that prevent the exploitation
of property rights).
91. See generally ELLICKSON, supra note 30; ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION (1990).
92. Merges, supra note 90, at 162-66; Robert P. Merges, ContractingInto
Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights
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Although there are some non-property legal issues involved
(particularly antitrust), this is not necessarily a long reach for
current intellectual property; the current regime already has
room for shared property rights when a set of creators define
themselves in advance as joint participants in the common
creation of some fixed product. 93 In this respect, intellectual
property is similar to the law of landed property, which also
can accommodate various mixes of limited common property,
sometimes in very complex contractual schemes like
condominiums and cooperatives-so long as the participants
and their rights are identified in advance.
Much more difficult and problematic, however, are the
emergent intellectual products of less easily defined groupsfolktales, folk art, local cultivars, and so on-products that are
in some ways always a work in progress, and that include
incremental contributions of group participants who are not
easily identified as individuals. 94 The growth of the Internet
has highlighted products of this emergent character, and in
that respect may constitute the most serious challenge for
intellectual property. Take, for example, the genre of writing
known as the "story tree"-a story started by one person,
added to by the next and so on. These story trees are by no
means new with the Internet; indeed, in a sense, folklore itself
is a kind of story tree production. More recently, story trees
have been a part of the fan magazine (or fanzine) culture
surrounding science fiction; Star Trek in particular has
generated quite a number, particularly among women fans. 95
Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1293-1330, 1355-58 (1996); see also
Gibbons, supra note 84, at 523-32 (calling for "contracting for governance in
cyberspace").
93. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1996) (defining authors of joint work as coowners). The notes of the Committee on the Judiciary, see H.R. Rep. No. 941476, at 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, describe a joint work
as one in which each participant prepares his or her contribution with the
knowledge and intent that it will be merged with the contributions of the
others. For antitrust issues in pooling intellectual property rights, see
Merges, supra note 92, at 1355-56 (attributing paucity of patent pools to
outmoded antitrust law). But see Laura G. Lape, A Narrow View of Creative
Cooperation:The Current State of Joint Work Doctrine, 61 ALB. L. REv. 43,

51-74 (1997) (describing judicial hostility to and narrow interpretation of the
joint work doctrine).
94. See Farley, supra note 48, at 9 (describing the emergent, communitybased character of folklore); id. at 29-31, 33-35 (noting that the communityoriented character of indigenous art presents problems for copyright
categories, including joint authorship).
95. See Camille Bacon-Smith, Spock Among the Women, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
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But the Internet has given new opportunities for story trees,
just as it has provided a forum for similarly interactive "chain
96
art" productions in the visual arts.
Traditional intellectual property has often been unhelpful
to this sort of production, so long as it is still in the form of a
loose, fluid, un-"fixed" collaborative activity rather than the
finished or purportedly finished production. 97 As critics of the
"author principle" have frequently pointed out, the
overwhelming rhetorical practice of intellectual property law is
to focus on the distinctive, completed work claimed by the
specified individual author or inventor 98-a
rhetoric of
romantic genius that is in some ways quite odd, since it
distorts the incremental and collaborative nature of much of
the actual creative process, both in the arts and the sciences. 99
16, 1986, § 7 (book review). For a discussion of a similar, but much earlier
form of interactive writing among women's clubs, see Anne Ruggles Gere,

Common Propertiesof Pleasure: Texts in Nineteenth Century Women's Clubs,
in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND
LITERATURE 383, 391-92 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994)
[hereinafter THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP].
96. See Chon, supra note 52, at 274 (describing the Internet Chain Art
Project). Jane Ginsburg uses a variant of a story tree to explore some of the
difficulties of copyright protection in cyberspace. See Jane Ginsburg, Putting

Cars on the "InformationSuperhighway: Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright
in Cyberspace,95 COLUAI. L. REV. 1466 (1995).
97. See Chon, supra note 52, at 266-69 (describing the difficulty of
applying traditional copyright law to a similar Internet production, "Chain
Art"); Farley, supra note 48, at 15-17, 56-57 (arguing that copyright law can
provide some protection to folklore, but also describing serious limitations);
Ginsburg, supra note 96, at 1498-99 (concluding that collective works have
"uncertain" protection in cyberspace); Lape, supra note 93, at 74-76
(describing the difficulties for "joint work" copyright protection for the
Internet's serial productions).
98. See ROSE, supra note 72, at 5-7; Boyle, supra note 9, at 56-57; Chon,
supra note 52, at 263-64; Coombe, supra note 74, at 251-52, 256-57.
Copyright law itself requires that a work be "fixed" for copyright to attach, a
requirement that may allow outsiders to appropriate folk art, see Farley,
supra note 48, at 27-29. For patent, see Shayana Kadidal, Subject-Matter
Imperialism? Biodiversity, Foreign Prior Art and the Neem Patent
Controversy, 37 IDEA 371, 389 (1997) (noting that the patent system favors
large inventive leaps over knowledge acquired in "incremental inventive
culture," but citing an incremental patent system derived from German
patent law).
99. See ROSE, supra note 72, at 122, 128 (observing that although
Shakespeare was treated as the quintessential lone genius in the emerging
argument for copyright in the eighteenth century, he was in fact steeped in
collaborative creation); Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary
Copyright and Collective Creativity, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP,
supra note 95, at 29, 38 (describing contemporary writing practice as
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Property theory of course suggests that the individual,
novel work has dominated intellectual property law not
because it captures the real character of the creative process,
but simply because it is easy,10O-certainly easier than affixing
a property label to the emergent work of amorphous groups. In
some measure, however, cultural bias may compound the
myopia toward less definite group productions. Story trees,
folklore and traditional plant products may go unrecognized as
property not only because of their indefinite group character,
but also because of dismissive attitudes toward their creators.
Those creators are often women on the one hand and
traditional peoples on the other. As to the former, some
feminist literature asserts that "women's work" has often
received short shrift in intellectual property law, observing for
example the slow recognition of quilting as an artform; not only
is quilting often the product of an indefinite group, but quilts
often use designs from natural objects that have been ruled to
be insufficiently "original" to merit copyright.101 As to the
latter, the failure to recognize traditional people's creative
work-in which generations of people add incrementally to
local legends, craft traditions, and cultivated products-has of
course led a number of critics to assert that author- and
inventor-centrism has the intended or unintended consequence
of privileging the intellectual products of the modern West over
the non-Western world, indeed permitting Western
appropriators to plunder the work of traditional peoples.10 2 Yet
the creators of these collaborative works could benefit from
property protection-not necessarily to cash in on their work,
but sometimes simply to achieve recognition, and to prevent
outsiders from appropriating and commercializing their
emergent artistic products.10 3 And the rest of us too could
"polyvocal"); Merges, supra note 90, at 164 (noting that although the "bold
individual" is the "darling" of the intellectual property system, scientific
research is in fact a group product); Martha Woodmansee, On the Author
Effect: Recovering Collectivity, in THE CONsTRUcTION OF AUTHORSHIP, supra
note 95, at 15, 24 (asserting that most contemporary writing is collaborative).
100. See supra text accompanying note 75.
101. See Shelley Wright, A FeministExplorationof the Legal Protectionof
Art, 7 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 59, 90-94, 96 (1994) (describing decisions
denying protection to women's sewing craft productions and noting the
marginalization of women under the myth of an artist as a romantic hero).
102. See Boyle, supra note 9, at 125-130; Kadidal, supra note 74, at 228-29;
Roht-Arriaza, supra note 74, at 929-47.
103. See Chon, supra note 52, at 274 (describing an Internet Chain Art
Project participant's sense that outsiders should not be able to appropriate
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benefit if such artistic endeavors had property protections,
since property protections might encourage artists to
collaborate in these productive and valuable creative activities.
No doubt some of these cultural biases have eroded
substantially in the last years. The Internet's story tree
culture and collaborative artworks-like the newly-awakened
demands of indigenous peoples' 04-- could erode such biases
even more dramatically, making salient the value of
interactive group productions, and perhaps changing the
implicit benefit/cost analysis that in the past has limited
protections for informal group activities. In this way, the
Internet could awaken a more general interest in property
rights for informal limited commons-that is, in the products
from "spaces" that are common to insiders, where each takes
inspiration from the others, but exclusive from outsiders, so
that the fruits of their intellectual products redound to the
benefit of the creators as a group. Even now, intellectual
property can accommodate protection for specified groups with
specified products, and some biases against incrementallycreated traditional production seem to be waning. But more
profoundly, the Internet's interactive works suggest that it
may be the "spaces," rather than the products from those
spaces, that most require a rethinking of intellectual property
protection-the LCP as a set of activities rather than, or in
addition to, a set of products.
In brief, then, the Internet suggests several points about
the future of property: first, the net illustrates the point that
while the protections of property can indeed be useful on the
net, there can be too much property, in the sense that a merely
partial set of property rights may undermine or overwhelm
activities and resources not so easily reduced to property.
Second, the Internet suggests that there can be too much
chain artwork, e.g., for advertising); Gere, supra note 95, at 394 (noting that
nineteenth century literary women's clubs allowed easy access among
themselves but required permission for outsiders); Vibeke Sorensen, Thoughts
of a ComputerArtist, 75 OR. L. REV. 309, 315 (1996) (noting that artists use
the Internet to allow their works to be seen for free, but may copyright it to
prevent commercial use without credit); cf. Farley, supra note 48, at 14-15
(describing the indigenous concern that appropriation and reproduction rob
artwork of significance and damage religion and culture). One intriguing
possibility would be to treat emergent works as "performances" which might
allow performers to block unauthorized "fixation." See Copyright Act of 1976,

17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996).

104. See Coombe, supra note 74, at 269 (observing that claims of nonWestern people may put categories of intellectual property under scrutiny).
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property in another sense: the gaudy looseness of public access
vitally nourishes the creativity that our intellectual property
laws aim to foster. Finally, the net introduces a more subtle
aspect of property than propertization vel non: we need to be
looking for property in unconventional places, and most
particularly in emergent activities of interactive groups. The
net dramatizes something that we should have known all
along: that many kinds of intellectual production may be best
fostered in a "limited commons," where members encourage
one another internally but still preserve a domain of their own,
separate from the rest of the world.
Curiously enough, the intellectual property canon has
seemed to recognize fairly readily the value of open access for
the public at large, for example by incorporating "fair use" and
by limiting the time of intellectual property protection. But
rather less attention has been paid to the value of the limited
common property. 105 Even more curiously, this blind spot in
some ways replicates a blind spot with respect to property in
physical resources.
In that domain, Elinor Ostrom has
vigorously attacked the widely-stated notion that the only
solutions to the "tragedy of the commons" are either private
property on the one hand or governmental command and
control management on the other. 106 Instead, she has insisted
that scholars and policy-makers pay attention to the vast
numbers of informal limited commons that in fact make up a
widespread intermediary management strategy throughout the
world. 107 It is no accident that Robert Merges, one of the chief
proponents of limited common rights in intellectual property,
prominently cites Ostrom's work.1 08 The work of these scholars
suggests that in the domain of physical things as well as
creative ones, the activities in the limited commons have
eluded conventional western concepts of property-to our own
considerable detriment-and are only now coming into their
own as a focus for "limited common" property rights.

105. An important exception is Robert Merges, see supra notes 90 and 92;
another is Margaret Chon, see supra note 52, at 275-76 (describing benefits of
expanding "jointwork" category for copyright protection).
106. OSTROM, supra note 91, at 8-13 (attacking the theories of either
"Leviathan" or "privatization" as the "only way" to solve problems of the
commons).
107. See id. at 15-21, 24-25.
108. Merges, supra note 90, at 160-62; Merges, supranote 92, at 1322-23.
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Ill. ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
As in the tradition of intellectual property, a sharp antiproperty strain runs through the tradition of environmentalism. The environmental historian Theodore Steinberg,
for example, subtitled his book on property and the
environment aThe Folly of Owning Nature," reflecting the
persistent thought that nature is far too grand for the meager
categories of human control. 09 Deep ecologists, environmental
ethicists, and ecofeminists are among those who have argued
that the capitalist institutions like property are part and
parcel of a misguided attempt to dominate nature, and to treat
nature as severable, mechanical parts rather than as an
integrated, interactive whole-with dreadful results for our
treatment of natural systems.1 1 0 The strident claims of socalled "property rights" groups, the attacks on environmental
measures as "takings" of private property-all have
undoubtedly exacerbated many environmentalists' sense that
an undue attention to private property is a central feature of
the general human despoiling of the environment.'
In spite this strain of skepticism about property within
environmentalism, the last several years have seen an
astonishing burst of property thinking in environmental law.
Putting to one side the ever-disputed "takings" issue, the most
noticeable impact of property concepts has occurred in the
discussion and implementation of market-oriented environmental controls. Among these controls' central models for
pollution control and resource conservation are regulatorilycreated, transferable property-like rights. 12 Richard Stewart
109.

THEODORE STEINBERG, SLIDE MOUNTAIN, OR, THE FOLLY OF OWNING

NATURE 48-50 (1995).
110. See CAROLYN MERCHANT, THE DEATH OF NATURE 185-90, 287-88
(1980) (describing a seventeenth century intellectual transformation in the
concept of nature); see also MURRAY BOOKCHIN, THE MODERN CRISIS 49-76
(1986) (rejecting capitalist institutions as hierarchical and divisive, whereas
"social ecology" recognizes nature as holistic, interactive); Angus Write, Who
Owns Nature? Property, Privilege, and Ecology in the Americas (Feb. 20,
1998) (typescript, on file with the author) (attributing environmental
degradation to property). But see Jim Dodge, Living by Life: Some
Bioregional Theory and Practice, in PETER C. LIST, RADICAL
ENvIRONMENTALISM: PHILOSOPHY AND TACTICS 108, 115-16 (1993) (rejecting
"land aristocracy" but describing buying land as a good "bioregionalist" tactic).
11L See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for Abolition of the
Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89 (1995).
112. An early discussion was J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND
PRICES: AN ESSAY IN POLICY-MAKING AND ECONOmICS (1968).

Somewhat
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is one of the environmental law scholars who has long
championed these property-like schemes,113 and, lamenting the
lack of a good shorthand term to describe them, falls back on
the phrase "hybrid property." 14
A. THE ADVENT OF "HYBRID PROPERTY"
A great deal of our normal property is "hybrid" in the
sense of owing its existence and management to regulation.
Formal intellectual property is of course entirely statutory;
property in corporate securities is so regulation-laden as to
have little existence independent of that regulatory regime;
and property in land itself has a large regulatory component,
even in something so elementary as our privileging of land
claims that are properly recorded or registered. But the
"hybrid property" that Stewart describes in environmental law
has a more distinctive character: it is focused on allocations of
rights to a larger resource whose total use has been consciously
limited through regulation.
The basic idea of this hybrid property is to preserve
resources that are large and diffuse but nevertheless finiteresources such as air, water or wildlife stocks. A hybrid
property regime begins by establishing a regulatory "cap" on
total use of a given resource; then within the capped allowable
amount, the regime allocates individual portions to persons or
entities; finally, these persons or entities can buy, sell or trade
their individual hybrid property rights to others. 15 Thus the
cap preserves the larger resource from over-appropriation,
while the individual hybrid rights facilitate trades among the

later, among others, was T.H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONs TRADING: AN
EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY (1985).

113. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming
EnvironmentalLaw: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J.

ENVTL. L. 171, 178-88 (1988) (arguing for tradable emission rights); Richard
B. Stewart, EnvironmentalRegulationand InternationalCompetitiveness, 102
YALE L.J. 2039, 2093-97 (1993) (arguing for tradable emission rights in
conjunction with other market-based incentive systems for environmental
protection).
114. Richard Stewart, Priprop,Regprop, and Beyond, 13 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POLY 91, 93 (1990); see also James E. Krier, Marketable Pollution
Allowances, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 449, 449 (1994) (using phrase "hybrid property
rights" for emission allowances).
115. See Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based
EnvironmentalRegulation:A New Erafrom an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1,
8-10 (1991) (describing marketable permit systems).
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appropriable amounts-trades that ultimately should place the
rights in the hands of those that most value them.
One of the chief predecessors to this approach came from
land use regulation, and specifically the regulation of overall
building density. In that domain, the chief hybrid property
mechanism has been a set of devices known as "transferable
development rights," or "TDRs," widely discussed now for
about a generation.1 6 The TDR concept gave regulators a
technique to curtail land development in one location, but, in
return, to permit the owner to build in excess of normal
regulatory bulk somewhere else-or even to sell the excess
development permission to a third party in the new location.
Implicit in the TDR concept was the idea that an area should
have some overarching density cap; but within that cap,
allowable density units could be moved from location to
location. Thus TDRs introduced the idea of an unconventional
form of hybrid and at least somewhat marketable
entitlements-entitlements effectively created by regulation.
In environmental circles, however, the breakthrough for
hybrid property occurred with the 1990 Amendments to the
Clean Air Act." 7 These amendments incorporated a scheme for
tradable emission rights for air pollution, particularly in the
precursor gases that precede the formation of acid rain. Once
again, the main components of the new acid rain program were
(1) a regulatory cap-here an upper limit on total allowable
emissions of acid rain precursors, notably sulfur dioxide; (2) a
division of the total permissible emission level into
individually-held, property-like "emission rights"; and (3)
institution of methods for trading the emission rights.
Since 1990, analogous concepts of hybrid property rights
have invaded many other areas of environmentalism. There
are now discussions of tradable rights for other kinds of air
116. See, e.g., James T.B. Tripp & Daniel J. Dudek, Institutional
Guidelinesfor DesigningSuccessful TransferableRights Programs, 6 YALE J.
ON REG. 369, 377-82 (1989) (including transferable development rights among
property approaches to environmental management). See generally JOHN
COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT (1974) (describing TDRs); Norman Marcus, Air
Rights Transfer in New York City, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 372 (1971)
(describing TDRs). Transferable development rights were also important in
Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
For a critique of TDRs, see F. JAMES & D. GALE, ZONING FOR SALE: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PROGRAMS 31-

34 (1977) (arguing that TDRs act as a tax on new development).
117. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, 7651-7651o (1990).
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pollutants, including the elusive and difficult precursors to
urban smog.118 Water pollution regulators have instituted
experiments with entitlements-trading as between point and
non-point sources.11 9 Fishery management agencies are
conducting experiments with individual transferable quotas
(ITQs) of fish catch.12 0 In international environmental law, a
current hot topic concerns the ways in which the developed
nations might purchase carbon dioxide reduction credits from
rainforest countries, so that greenhouse gases can be reduced
worldwide.12 1 Needless to say, all these schemes reflect a
standard idea in property: that is, property rights can
encourage careful resource management and conservation,
including investment in pollution reduction methods.
B. WHY Now? COSTS, BENEFITS AND UNCONVENTIONAL
PROPERTY

What is the source of this proliferation of "property-talk"
in environmental circles? Once again, the standard law and
economics benefit/cost calculation yields some useful ideas
about the reasons why property approaches seem so attractive.
First, the perceived benefits of property approaches may be
increasing with respect to environmental resources. Air,
water, and wildlife all suffer from increasing human pressures,
while new technology such as satellite monitoring has greatly
magnified our perceptions of those pressures. Pressured
resources in turn are a classic location upon which we often
think property approaches might help to reduce conflict and to
promote careful management and investment.
Second, the costs of property-like regimes have declined, at
least in some areas. Technological and administrative changes
have made some property rights cheaper to create and to
118. See, e.g., Maura Donal, Smog in Much of Basin Down 50%, Study
Says, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 1992, at Al (describing smog control, including a
new scheme for tradable pollution credits).
119. See William E. Taylor & Mark Gerath, The Watershed Protection
Approach: Is the Promise About to be Realized?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'r,
Fall 1996, at 16, 20 (describing several water pollution trading schemes).
120. See RIGHTS-BASED FISHING (Philip A. Neher et al. eds., 1988)
(containing articles on various forms of transferable quotas in fishing).
121. See, e.g., Climate Change: More than 2,400 Scientists Call for U.S. to
Have Emission Control Plan by December [May 1, 1997 to April 30, 1998], 28
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 404 (June 27, 1997) (calling for industrial nations to
develop emission allowance trading programs and to sponsor emission offset
projects in less developed nations).
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monitor. Tradable emission rights in sulfur dioxide are only
feasible because we can monitor whether rights-holders are
1 22
staying within the quotas that they have purchased.
International trade in carbon dioxide credits is only
conceivable because we now have remote sensing devices that
can monitor forest burnings and preservation-the same
remote sensing devices that let us recognize the devastating
effects of resource pressure in the first place. 123 Similarly, the
technology of administration has improved, at least
somewhat. 2 4 Hybrid property rights in environmental law can
only exist where our governmental institutions have the
capacity to run the regimes-to define total allowable use, to
allocate rights, to keep track of their trades and subsequent
uses, and, ultimately, to enforce the quotas. But these regimes
benefit from the increased regulatory capacity that comes from
information exchange among governments, 125 from enhanced
accountability following the collapse of a number of
authoritarian regimes, and from the watchdog activities of
environmental non-governmental organizations.
But there is a third reason why more property concepts are
appearing in environmental management, one that perhaps
often accompanies a greater perceived value in resources:
environmentalists have simply become more imaginative about

122. See, e.g., Gary E. Marchant, Global Warming: Freezing Carbon
Dioxide Emissions: An Offset Policy for Slowing Global Warming, 22 ENVTL.
L. 623, 645-46, 648 (1992) (discussing the monitoring and administration
requirements for sulfur dioxide trading programs, and surrounding
difficulties).
123. See Sharon Hatch Hodge, Comment, Satellite Data and
Environmental Law: Technology Ripe for Litigation Application, 14 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 691, 701-04 (1997) (describing the use of satellite technology
to monitor global atmospheric pollution and international consumption of
natural resources); James Gustave Speth, EPA Must Help Lead an
Environmental Revolution in Technology, 21 ENVTL. L. 1425, 1452 (1991)
(noting the role of remote sensing, among other technologies, in monitoring
global pollution).
124. See Marchant, supra note 122, at 634-35 (pointing out that the United
States has developed administrative expertise in emissions trading, although
not in emissions taxes); see also Tripp & Dudek, supra note 116, at 377-88
(describing lessons from existing environmental rights trading schemes used
by various states).
125. See, e.g., Daniel J. Dudek et al., Environmental Policy for Eastern
Europe: Technology-Based versus Market-Based Approaches, 17 COLUM J.
ENVTL L. 1, 16-18, 28-31 (1992) (arguing that the American experience with
market-based approaches can be instructive for Eastern European pollution
control).
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the kinds of resources and resource control to which they apply
the concepts of property. Hybrid property rights-the tradable
emission rights in air quality, the TDRs in land use, the ITQs
in fisheries-represent a considerable imaginative achievement.
An equally impressive imaginative achievement has been
the environmentalists' dawning recognition of previously
unnoticed resource users as potential candidates for some form
of entitlement. It has now come to be quite fashionable to
enlist local populations in wildlife or forest preservation, and
the allocation of entitlements is critical in that effort. Thus
local people may receive a portion of the revenues from game
parks, or become employees in ecotourism enterprises, or take
a share of the royalties from pharmaceuticals that derive from
the wild flora of their surroundings. 126 The very sensible hope
is that when local people have a stake in conservation, they
will report poachers instead of assisting them, or will protect
forest vegetation instead of burning it off. Indeed, Lee
Breckenridge has pointed out the convergence of ecosystem
management and human rights concerns, particularly with
respect to indigenous peoples in rainforest environments.12 7
Closer to home, some environmentalist organizations have
begun to pay western ranchers to induce them to tolerate wolf
dens on their land; effectively, this entails a recognition that
the ranchers control the wildlife in practice if not in lawnevertheless, the ranchers may be induced to preserve the
wolves for a fee, rather than simply destroying the animals as
pests.128 Such programs, hesitant and error-prone though they

126. See, e.g., NANCY LEE PELUSO, RICH FOREST, POOR PEOPLE: RESOURCE
CONTROL AND RESISTANCE IN JAVA 235-37 (1992) (describing how state

commanded systems have failed to preserve Indonesian forests, and arguing
that local populations should be integrated into forest management to deal
with this problem); R. David Simpson & Roger A. Sedjo, Contracts for
TransferringRights to Indigenous Genetic Resources, RESOURCES, Fall 1992,
at 1 (discussing contracts for sharing pharmaceutical royalties with rainforest
countries); Eric Weiner, Ecotourism: Can It Protect the Planet?, N.Y. TIMES,
May 19, 1991, § 5, at 15 (discussing recruitment of locals in ecotourism).
127. Lee P. Breckenridge, Protection of Biological and CulturalDiversity:
Emerging Recognition of Local .Community Rights in Ecosystems Under
InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, 59 TENN. L. REv. 735 (1992).
128. See John A. Baden & Robert Ethier, Montana's Wolf Experiment:
Carrots and Carnivores, SEATTLE TIMES, July 22, 1992, at A9 (describing a
wildlife conservation group's program to pay landowners where wolves
successfully reproduce).

19981

THE SEVERAL FUTURES OFPROPERTY

169

may be, represent a creative reach across the boundaries set by
prior customs, legal conventions, and intransigence.
In spite of the blossoming of imaginative new quasiproperty arrangements in environmental management,
however, some members of the environmental community
continue to challenge the idea that property is an appropriate
vehicle for the human interaction with nature. Their reasons
fall into two broad categories, somewhat reminiscent of the
cyberspace antipropertarians. The first is that property
regimes in environmental management are partial and hence
distorted, and thus create contention and overreaching rather
than peace and productivity. The second is more radical: that
property in the environment is inherently undesirable, because
property approaches lose sight of-and blight-the fruitful
interactions among the multiple parts of larger ecosystems.
Unlike the antiproperty writers in the cyberspace arena,
however, the environmental antipropertarians generally do not
look to a wide open, uncontrolled commons as the solution, but
rather to some version of centralized command and control
regulation.
C. Too MUCH PROPERTY OR NOT ENOUGH? THE PARTiAL
PROPERTIZATION CONUNDRUM REVISITED
In environmentalism as in cyberspace, there is something
of an "argument from futility" about property rights:
environmental resources, it is said, are so interconnected and
complex, and so needful of flexible management, that property
rights are likely to "get it wrong," introducing a rhetoric of
fixity that only leads to misunderstanding and strife. Scholars
of water law, for example, have argued that little is to be
gained by calling entitlements "property" without considering
the background context; the "property" designation rather
leads people to ignore the overlapping nature of their claims
and the need for change, and to think that their rights have
greater expanse than they actually should.129 Thus New
Zealand fisheries managers found themselves ensnared in
claims for compensation from holders of individual fishing
quota rights, when it turned out that total fish availability had

129. See Benson, supra note 24, at 367 (citing Barton Thompson's
comments that "ownership" of water is too simplistic a concept); Sax, supra
note 24, at 944, 950-51 (noting changing public claims on water).
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been overestimated and quotas had to be reduced; 130 thus, to
avoid such misunderstandings and to head off the otherwise
predictable "takings" claims, the Clean Air Act carefully
declined to designate tradable emission rights as compensable
13
"property." 1
Why might property rights "get it wrong" for complex
environmental resources? As in cyberspace, property rights
are likely to be partial; partial propertization leads to
imbalance, and imbalance may lead to conflict and waste.
Because property enlists our self-interest, it catches our
attention; indeed, this attention-getting capacity is one of the
advantages of property, particularly in environmental matters,
where the diffuseness of harms is likely to mask the gravity of
widespread resource depletions. 3 2 But even more clearly than
in intellectual property, when we propertize certain aspects of
the environment-for example, some particularly desirable
plant or animal-we may reduce attention to other aspects of
an ecosystem taken as a whole.
Take, for example, property rights in certain kinds of fish:
hybrid property rights, created through a licensing system,
give fishers incentives to catch those fish at appropriate levels;
but these hybrid entitlements may do little to preserve the
non-target fish. Fishers may indiscriminately destroy the nontarget species as so-called by-catch; 133 or, in order to avoid
paying for quota, they may shift their efforts and overfish the
"free" non-target fish.134 Indeed, some critics point out that if
the hybrid property rights are not defined sufficiently
precisely, they may encourage waste in the very resource they
130. See Individual Transferable Fish HarvestPrivileges:Hearings Before

the Subcomm. on Fisheries of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and

Fisheries, (1994) (testimony of the Environmental Defense Fund) [hereinafter
Hearings] (noting that New Zealand's definition of individual fishing quota
rights required costly buy-back of rights when it turned out that available
catch limit had been set too high); see also Carrie A. Tipton, Protecting
Tomorrow's Harvest: Developing a National System of Individual
Transferable Quotas to Conserve Ocean Resources, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 381,

411-12 (1995) (discussing concerns over takings claims in planning American
ITQ fisheries).
131. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(f) (1995) (stating that a sulfur
dioxide emission allowance "does not constitute a property right").
132. See Carol M. Rose, EnvironmentalLessons, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1023,
1024-26 (1994).
133. See RIGHTs-BAsED FIsHING, supra note 120, at 117, 140-42
(discussing the difficulty of controlling discarding of by-catch in ITQ regimes).
134 See Tipton, supra note 130, at 414 (noting the substitution problem).
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are aimed at preserving: fishers with ITQs for a particular
species, for example, may have an incentive to dispose of all
but the largest specimens, since the larger fish bring more at
the market. 135 There are similar issues with respect to
hunting. Hunting licenses are a version of hybrid property,
requiring hunters to pay a fee for some share in a total
allowable take, and sometimes plowing the fees back into
habitat restoration for the game animals. 36 But when
entitlements focus attention on the game species, non-game
species may be disregarded, even though they play a critical
role in the ecosystem as a whole. Water pollution gives
another example: hybrid property schemes to reduce water
pollution normally focus on end-of-the-pipe "point sources,"
since these are easier to propertize than the more diffuse nonpoint sources such as runoff. But in allocating pollution rights
to point sources in exchange for their cleanup of offsetting nonpoint sources, both point and non-point cleanup costs are
effectively loaded on the point sources.137 Among other things,
this should raise some concerns about substitution effects, i.e.,
polluters may attempt to avoid the "point source" designation
by declining to channel and collect pollutants, with the result
that pollution becomes less controllable. 38 Command and
control regimes do not necessarily escape such problems,139 but

135. See RIGHTS-BASED FIsHING, supra note 120, at 115 (noting that ITQs
may give incentives to excessive discarding of non-target fish and less
valuable target fish, with consequences for larger ecology).
136. This is the pattern of the popular Duck Stamp Act, 16 U.S.C. § 718
(1996). A similar pattern has also been suggested for tradable emission
rights, see Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 113, at 180-81 (arguing for the
auction of emission rights with auction fees returning to environmental
agencies).
137. See Taylor & Gerath, supra note 119, at 20 (noting that the bulk of
the trading burden may fall on point sources).
138. This is also a concern raised by conventional command and control
regulation, which regulates point sources more heavily than non-point
sources.
139. For distortions under command and control regulations, see Sierra
Club v. Abston Construction Co., 620 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that
under command and control regulations, wastes channeled into sediment
basins are regulated more heavily, as point sources, than unchanneled "nonpoint" wastes); ALLSTON CHASE, PLAYING GOD IN YELLOWSTONE: THE
DESTRUCTION OF AMERICA'S FIRST NATIONAL PARK 18-30, 36-37, 50-53 (1986)

(criticizing sharply Park Service's management ofYellowstone for capitulation
to elk hunters, effectively inducing the Service to manage the park as a
breeding ground for elk, even though elles browsing habits drove out other
species).
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hybrid property regimes can sometimes exacerbate them, in
part because property introduces a rhetoric and mentality of
entitlement.
Indeed, one notices the issue of partial propertization
lurking beneath the surface of "environmental justice"
concerns, where some argue that poor and minority
neighborhoods have been targeted disproportionately as sites
for the production and disposal of hazardous materials. 40 One
perspective on these issues suggests not so much direct racism
as a new twist on a familiar problem of partial property.
Robert Collins has argued that a critical indirect role in
environmental justice problems has been played by the socalled "not-in-my-back-yard" or NIMBY syndrome. 141 Although
by no means an elite matter-many leaders were initially quiet
mothers in blue-collar neighborhoods-4 2 -NIMBY protests have
been the vehicle through which relatively better organized
communities have exerted an effective property right over their
neighborhood quality, inducing politicians and facilities
managers to search elsewhere for sites for hazardous
facilities. 4 3
Conversely, insofar as weaker or minority
neighborhoods have lagged in organization and protest, they
may have looked cheap and accessible-hence the complaint
that NIMBY turns into PIBBY: "place-in-blacks'-backyard."144
If this is indeed the sequence with respect to hazardous siting,
then it resembles the partial propertization in a fishery or a
140. For a brief overview of the growing concern regarding environmental
justice issues, see Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing"EnvironmentalJustice": The
DistributionalEffects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787,
801-06 (1993), and sources cited therein.
141. Robert W. Collin, Environmental Equity: A Law and Planning
Approach to EnvironmentalRacism, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 495, 509-10 (1992).

142. For the somewhat under-studied role of women in grassroots
environmental organizations, see Robert R.M. Verchick, In a Greener Voice:
Feminist Theory and Environmental Justice, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 23
(1996) (exploring the role of women in environmental grassroots
organizations) and Ronald Alsop, Amateur Ecologists: Local Citizen Groups
Take a Growing Role Fighting Toxic Dumps, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1983
(describing opponents to toxic sites as blue collar; pointing out the role of
housewives).
143. See William Glaberson, Coping in the Age of "Nimby", N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 1988, § 3, at 1 (describing the consultant's effort to find demographic
characteristics least likely to resist waste siting decisions-e.g., small-town,
rural, conservative, low income, etc.).
144. Collin, supra note 141, at 509-10. The PIBBY acronym is from
ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXI: RACE, CLASS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 5 (1990).
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hunting area: one cannot simply organize a single aspect of the
whole, because that aspect will get attention at the expense of
others; instead, one has to propertize all aspects--or failing
that, fall back on some safety net of command and control.1 45
There is considerable controversy over the role that race
plays in these modern siting questions, 146 but the more general
point is that in environmental matters as elsewhere, partial
propertization can lead to distortion. The problem is not that a
property regime fails to encourage investment and
conservation in the propertized resource; quite the contrary,
conservation of that resource may be disproportionately great,
while the use of non-propertized resources is simply
spendthrift-an imbalance that can threaten a larger and
intricately interrelated ecosystem.1 47
Moreover, it is easy to see that such distortions usually
derive from a classic characteristic of property: some things are
simply easier to turn into property than others, and the easy
things are likely to get propertized first-leaving the rest
behind. Indeed, the most glaring distortion comes from the
ease of propertizing land in comparison to the diffuse resources
to which land is attached, like air, water and wildlife-with the
effect that landowners may claim that regulation of land
"takes" their property rights, while ignoring their own inroads
on common resources. 148

145. In the environmental justice context, a command and control
regulation now protects against governmental agencies' ignoring the interests
of poor and minority communities. Executive Order Number 12989, 3 C.F.R.
859 (1994), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (1994) requires federal agencies to
analyze disproportionate health or environmental effects of federal actions on
minority and low income populations.
146. See Vicki Been, Analyzing Evidence of Environmental Justice, 11 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 21 (1995) (arguing that issues of income, class,
education, and employment are as important or more important than race in
sitings). For a review of some of the controversies, particularly concerning
statistical studies, see id. at 1-4, and sources cited therein. Professor Been
has also stressed the importance of distinguishing cases in which unwanted
uses are sited from the outset in predominantly minority neighborhoods, from
other cases in which minority members disproportionately move into the
vicinity of such a site because the site makes nearby land cheaper, see Vicki
Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods:
DisproportionateSiting or MarketDynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383 (1994).
147. See Hearings, supra note 130 (calling for "iron-clad harvest limits" in
"virtually every fishery" in order for ITQs to be effective); Tipton, supra note
130, at 414-15 (calling for a multi-species version of ITQs).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 21-28.
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But notice that, in a sense, just as in one strand of
contention about intellectual property, the problem of partial
propertization is not an argument against property at all. In
theory, the first-best solution would be more complete property,
sweeping in those elements that may be overlooked or overexploited because they are still free goods. Where
propertization is only partial-where only some portion of a
number of interrelated resources can be cheaply turned into
property but others cannot--distortions are bound to arise, and
for that reason we may continue to need some corrective to deal
with the non-propertized elements. In the cyberspace
antiproperty arguments, the solution is to abandon property
altogether, and to return to free-wheeling, open-access
commons. But here the environmental antiproperty takes a
very different turn: it too eschews property, but calls rather
toward a continuation of a command and control regulatory
regime. Thus, in this context, the too-much-property argument
concludes that we cannot entirely shift from centralized,
command and control management regimes until we have
better means to propertize more completely the varying
149
interactive elements of an entire ecosystem.
At bottom, the problem of partial propertization in
ecosystem management
raises the economists' category of the
"second-best": 50 a command and control regime could be
preferable as a second-best approach where it is too expensive
to define and defend property rights completely; but, arguably,
the first-best solution would mean not less property, but more.
D. ECOSYSTEMS AND LIMITED ENVIRONMENTAL COMMONS

A second anti-property strand in environmentalism is a
more straightforward rejection of property, and a more
enthusiastic endorsement of a kind of pro-commons outlook.
Radical environmentalists have long stressed that the
environment must be understood as an entire interactive
system, and, in particular, that human beings should practice
a non-instrumentalist ethic that places human activities in the
149. See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal versus Real Regulatory Efficiency:
Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory

Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267-73 (1985) (expressing concern that economic
incentives and property-based approaches may be impracticable in application
and should not displace command and control).
150. See id. at 1270-71, 1302 (describing command and control as the
"second-best" solution).
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context of interconnected ecosystems. 15' On this account, the
environmental whole is greater than the sum of the parts; the
isolation of one element for pragmatic "resource development"
may unravel the larger networks of biota that mutually
support one other.152 This view has implications for property:
it suggests that while property may indeed focus our attention,
it misguidedly focuses our attention on the parts rather than
the whole. An attempt to divide an ecosystem entirely into bits
and pieces of property would thus detract from what is needed,
that is, a holistic view of an ecosystem or indeed the earth in
its entirety. But generally speaking, environmentalists taking
holistic approaches also seem to contemplate not an open
access regime for nature but rather some form of larger-scale
153
controls over human activities.
Interestingly enough, however, some holistic approaches
do implicitly adopt a property approach with respect to
particular ecosystems. Radical environmentalists as well as
others have shown considerable interest in reserving distinct
ecosystems for local people, or for the indigenous populations
that have fruitfully interacted with them over long periods of
time. 54 In such cases, holism still includes the concept of
151. See Bill Devall, The Deep Ecology Movement, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J.
299, 309-13 (1980).
152. EUGENE P. ODUM, FUNDAMENTALS OF ECOLOGY 408 (3d ed. 1971)
(arguing that environment change must be understood as a complex whole,
rather than "on the basis of isolated projects"); see also GEORGE P. MARSH,
THE EARTH AS MODIFIED BY HUMAN ACTION 33-41 (2d ed. 1882) (describing

the interconnectedness of nature and the destructiveness of human
interventions).
153. See, e.g., Cymie Payne, Foreword to the Ecosystem Approach: New
Departuresfor Land and Water, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1997) (suggesting that
the first hallmark of ecosystem management is "taking the ecosystem as a
unit to be managed and regulated"). Despite the considerable antibureaucratic strain in "deep ecology" and some of the more radical strains of
environmentalism, writers contemplate considerable control over human
activities. See, e.g., Devall, supra note 151, at 313 (rejecting bureaucratic
control but calling for the designation of large areas of the earth as "off limits"
to dense human settlement or development).
154. See Devall, supra note 151, at 315-16 (citing P. BERG & R. DASSMANN,
A SEPARATE COUNTRY (1978)) (calling for community
regeneration of ecosystems, using Native American communities as model);
REINHABITING

see also PETER C. LIST, RADICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM 12 (1993) (explaining

the "bioregionalism" philosophy of Murray Bookchin and others as an
environmentalist theory of integrating human and natural systems in local
places); Gary Snyder, The Place, the Region and the Commons, in THE
PRACTICE OF THE WILD 25-47 (1990) (discussing "growing into a natural
community" from a Native American perspective); Breckenridge, supra note
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property, since the vision of a community that is integrated
into the ecosystem implies that insiders share duties and
benefits from which outsiders are excluded. In such a vision,
the holistic claim effectively constitutes another version of an
argument not against property rights as such, but rather in
favor of property rights at the community level-that is to say,
property in the form of the limited commons.
Construed as arguments for limited commons regimes,
ecosystem approaches are linked to some quite practical
critiques of hybrid property regimes. According to some critics,
hybrid property regimes thus far have simply attempted to
mimic conventional, individually-held entitlements,
and, in
doing so, have missed important opportunities to build on
LCPs and on the internal norms embedded in such regimes.
Fisheries management offers an example: in criticizing the
experiments in individual trading quotas (ITQs) for fish, Alison
Rieser has pointed out that many fisheries throughout the
world have decidedly communal features, and that in devising
hybrid property rights schemes, we should be thinking more
about these LCPs, perhaps allocating fishing quota rights to
communities rather than to individuals, so as to replicate and
enhance the existing normative structures of community
management. 155 Indeed, one might well think that ITQsparticularly given their uneven distribution among existing
fishers-might sometimes foster dissension and a decline of
environmental responsibility among the members of existing
fishing communities. 156 Quite aside from that, fisheries and
marine environments are extremely complex, and Rieser
argues that at least in some instances, community-level
management is likely to deal with these complexities more
efficiently, and more ecologically soundly, than can
individuals.157 Vis-h-vis outsiders, community-based manage127, at 738-39 (summarizing convergent human rights and environmentalist
perspectives by focusing on the protection of indigenous peoples within given
ecosystems).
155. Alison Rieser, Property Rights and Ecosystem Management in U.S.
Fisheries:Contractingfor the Commons?, 24 ECOLOGYL.Q. 813, 824-27 (1997).
156. See Gisli Palsson, Learning by Fishing: Practical Science and
Scientific Practice, in PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL

(Susan Hanna
& Mohan Munasinghe eds. 1995) (attributing environmental degradation,
waste, and eroding responsibility to the institution of privatization on former
communal regimes).
157. Rieser, supra note 155, at 824 (noting the ability of community
fisheries to police habitat, prevent pollution, and coordinate with other fishing
CONTEXT: CASE STUDIES AND DESIGN APPLICATIONS 85, 93-94
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ment regimes can use their powers of exclusion to hold down
the numbers of participants in resource extraction; 158 vis-h-vis
fellow insiders, smaller and more close-knit groups can agree
on more nuanced and intricate sets of rights and
responsibilities than would be possible among the holders of
the generic, centrally-defined ITQs.159
Another environmental law scholar, Eric Freyfogle, makes
the case that at the landscape level, we might also get more
environmental mileage out of community efforts than
individual ones, for many of the same reasons: purely
individual actions may overlap and interact poorly, whereas
individuals within communities can work out quite intricate
sets of internal rights, responsibilities, and overarching norms
of expected give and take.160 If that is the case, then perhaps
at least some of the new hybrid property rights should fall at
the community level rather than the individual level.
Indeed, one might suggest that these writers illustrate a
more general advantage that limited common property regimes
may have over either individualized property on the one hand
or government fiat on the other: a community-based resource
management may be large enough to internalize the
externalities of certain kinds of resource use, but, at the same
time, it can be small enough to reduce bargaining costs among
the participants, so that they can arrive at complex and
nuanced norms to allocate mutual rights and responsibilities.
The result could be "property on the outside, contract (or
norms) on the inside"--that is, the highly intricate but also
often very effective and durable common property regimes seen
over time throughout the world.
Community-based property regimes of this sort may not
"look like property" from a conventional Western perspective,
since individual entitlements within that community are
communities to enhance the fishery ecosystems).
158. See, e.g., ACHESON, supra note 35, at 74-76, 153-59 (illustrating that
perimeter-defended areas protect the lobster population better than nucleated
areas around the Green, Metinic, and Monhegan Islands).
159. See id. at 76-77 (describing lobster fishing norms among the
fishermen within the territorial systems); see also Rieser, supra note 155, at
826-27 (describing community management as more nuanced than
government regulation, including ITQs).
160. Eric T. Freyfogle, Ethics, Community, and PrivateLand, 23 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 631, 640-41, 652-55 (1996) (describing the historic connections between
community membership and land use, suggesting modern ecological

equivalents).
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hemmed in by complex norms and agreements; but there are
actually a considerable number of precedents for them, even in
Western law. The easy versions (like the easy versions of joint
ownership in intellectual property) are the arrangements in
which a number of specific rights-holders consciously pool their
resources and plan in advance for their joint obligations and
expectations. Thus nineteenth century state law permitted
what was effectively a scheme of "unitization" to allow
communities of salt marsh property owners to organize
management regimes for the marshes and prevent freeriding.161
More modern versions of such projects are
unitization in oil and gas, or condominium regimes organized
under modern statutes. Environmentalists have begun to
organize limited common property regimes as well: such
groups as the Georgia Environmental Policy Institute in the
southeast, or the Sonoran Institute in the southwestern United
States and northern Mexican states, or the Malpai
Borderlands Group in New Mexico have undertaken to gather
together interested parties-so-called "stakeholders"-in
sensitive ecological resource areas, and to work out consensual
arrangements, reinforced by legal devices, to share
responsibility for managing these resources in sustainable
ways.1 62
The most difficult of these limited common property
regimes are those whose memberships are less definite, and
whose goals may shift, such as ecosystems managed by
indigenous groups. Like folklore or the progressive artworks in
161. Kim Sebold, We Turn to Mother Earth: The Reclamation of Maine's
Salt Marshes (Mar. 7, 1997) (unpublished manuscript presented to the
American Society for Environmental History, on file with the author)
(describing Maine salt marsh organizations and legal structures).
162. See Jake Page, Ranchers Form a 'Radical Center' to Protect Wide-

Open Spaces, SMITHSONIAN MAG., June 1997, at 50 (discussing the Maipai
Borderlands Group uniting to manage resources); Interview by Carol M. Rose
with Laurie Fowler, Exec. Dir., Georgia Environmental Policy Institute (Apr.
3, 1997); Interview with Luther Probst, Exec. Dir., Sonoran Institute (May 5,

1997); see also Federico Cheever, Public Good and PrivateMagic in the Law of
Land Trusts and Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled

Future, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1077 (1997) (discussing the possibilities and
pitfalls of the legal devices for conservation). The forthcoming American Law
Institute's Third Restatement of Servitudes, may make such efforts easier by
simplifying the complex law of easements and covenants. The reform could
make it easier for participants in preservation groups to organize their
respective rights and obligations. However, this Restatement could also
present difficulties; see generally id. at 1099 (describing the potential
destruction of land trusts under doctrines in Third Restatement).
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cyberspace, these common resources are works in progress, and
the participants who shape them are not entirely specifiable;
indeed, the memberships are more akin to family or political
communities than to such explicitly consensual communities
as condominiums. Establishing limited common property
regimes for such participants is a much trickier enterpriseyet also not without precedent in the common law. British
customary law recognized evolving limited common property
rights in communities well into the nineteenth century; those
communities (but not outsiders) enjoyed rights to such various
economic and recreational uses of land, and they were expected
to govern their own behavior through reasonable community
norms1 63 In the United States, judicially-created riparian law
in the nineteenth century effectively turned river-bank
landowners into participants in common property regimes for
particular rivers, from which outsiders were excluded (no
interbasin water transfers) and insiders were each expected to
use the common resource "reasonably"-in effect, in a way that
was compatible with equal correlative use by all the other
riparian owners. 164 Nuisance law, using precepts very like
those of riparian law, effectively created common property
regimes among the neighbors for the reasonable preservation
of their common enjoyment of quiet, clean air, and water;
again, the participants were expected to act according to
"reasonable" norms of mutual forbearance. 165 It has only been
a failure of our own imagination that has kept us from seeing
these judicially-created regimes for what they are-common
property regimes involving emergent resource uses, including
only imprecisely specified participants.
Modern environmentalists have a special reason to pay
attention to emergent commons regimes of this sort. Just as

163. See Rose, supra note 50, at 739-44. Courts in the United States were
more hostile to customary claims, partly because of the feudal origin of such
claims and partly because their informal governance role seemed contrary to
constitution-based government. See id. at 741-43; see also Fred Bosselman,
Limitations Inherent in the Title to Wetlands at Common Law, 15 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 247, 273-88 (1996) (describing the medieval English commons in
the wetlands as controlled by the "fen people").
164. See ROSE, supra note 16, at 163 (discussing riparian regimes); see also
RIPARIAN RIGHTS, NEW PALGRAvE DICTIONARY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS

(forthcoming 1998).
165. See Louise A. Halper, Nuisance, Courts and Markets in the New York
Court of Appeals, 1850-1915, 54 ALB. L. REv. 301, 349-54 (1990) (describing
the spirit of compromise of turn-of-the-century nuisance law).
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the critics of Romantic Authorship assert that creative works,
however fixed they seem, are actually parts of an interactive
and emergent process, so does ecosystem theory increasingly
suggest that all ecosystems have the dynamic character of
works in progress. According to many new ecological theorists,
there is no "balance of nature," no static climax state toward
which environmentalism can drive. Instead, every ecosystem
is always in an emergent state, whose participants and
constituent features may be roughly known but not completely
specifiable in advance.1 66 If that is true, then the task of
devising and learning from these fluid, emergent forms of
limited common property may be especially acute-for the
"adaptive management" that now seems required in
environmental matters, 67 just as for the patent pools,
participatory artworks and story trees of cyberspace.
CONCLUSION
Property has always concerned the encouragement of
investment and the reduction of strife. Those are among the
most important reasons that we have property. The law and
economics approach teaches that the future of property will
revolve around the rising perceived benefits and the falling
perceived costs of establishing property regimes. But new
property developments in cyberspace and environmentalism
offer some important additions and correctives to this picture
of the future.
First, cyberspace and environmentalist critics of property
implicitly point our attention to some unexpected costs of
property. In particular, they point out that the course of
propertization may be partial and uneven and that the
distortions from partial propertization may be both destructive
of resources and distributionally unfair, producing strife and
rancor rather than peace and productiveness.

166. An important book attacking the idea of a "balance of nature" is
DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1990).
See also A. Dan Tarlock, The
Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of
Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121 (1994) (describing the
implications of Botkin's ideas for environmental management). See generally
Colloquy: Beyond the Balance of Nature: EnvironmentalLaw Faces the New

Ecology, 7 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (1996) (regarding a symposium on
new ecological models and their legal implications).
167. See Tarlock, supra note 166, at 1139-40.
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Second, quite aside from such distortions, both cyberspace
and environmentalism raise issues about the desirability of
turning resources into property at all. Cyberspace discussions
in particular continue a rich tradition in intellectual property,
one that has long sought a balance between property rights on
the one hand, and on the other hand the interactive creativity
that occurs in a wide open commons. The environmental
analog is the argument for holistic ethics, portraying nature as
an interactive whole that would be disrupted by division into
property rights; here, however, the proffered solution is not at
all the wide open commons, but rather diligent centralized
oversight.
Third, and perhaps most surprising, both cyberspace and
environmentalism bring into relief a certain cultural blank
spot in our thinking about property. That blank spot is the
difficulty we often have in recognizing the value, or even the
existence, of the limited commons, the resource management
practices that are "commons" among the insiders but exclusive
with respect to outsiders. The difficulty is especially acute
when the limited commons revolves about emergent,
interactive resource use, by somewhat indefinite participants,
whose interactions smack more of ongoing political
participation than of fixed contractual arrangements.
Cyberspace gives useful examples, as in the proliferation of
story trees or collaborative artworks in progress, created by
groups of successive writers. Environmentalism gives still
more, in the great variety of limited common property
resources, from indigenous forests and fisheries to
neighborhood efforts to shape local landscapes.
The emergent, interactive characteristics of these limited
common property regimes mirror the core attributes of much
creative production and perhaps all ecological change; creative
works and ecological change too are in their own ways
emergent and interactive. The unfortunate pattern, however,
has often been to ignore these limited common property
regimes or deny them any legal status. This works to the
considerable detriment of the underlying resources and the
often under-recognized peoples who contribute to the
preservation of those resources-and to the detriment of our
own ability to come to grips with the strengths and weaknesses
of these limited common regimes and their appropriate role in
the larger political community.
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Nevertheless, our law does offer some assistance to the
formation and maintenance of limited common property
regimes, including the law of servitudes, riparianism,
nuisance, and customary law. All these legal areas include
complex devices, and as law and economics approaches inform
us, their great complexity may be one reason why they have
not been used as much as perhaps they should be. They are
simply too difficult to organize and to keep organized. But
another reason that common property arrangements have been
underutilized is that we have often been myopic about them.
Even the participants in limited common property regimes
may not think of their participation as partaking of property at
all, while outsiders may be hostile to them as "private
governments.'1 68 This is a cultural matter, not just a costbenefit or technological one. Cyberspace and environmentalism
may ask us to re-examine this culture; and, if so, they may
demonstrate one of the most important new directions in the
future of property.

168. See ROSE, supra note 16, at 125-26 (describing hostility of American
courts to customary communities); see also EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA:
HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE
GOVERNMENT (1994) (critical description of private communities).

